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Very few developments have ever transformed either tort or insurance 
law. One development—as important in our time as the adoption of liability 
for negligence was in the 19th century or the rise of strict products liability 
was in the 20th century—transformed both. That is the rise of long-tail civil 
liability. A long-tail claim involves tortious or other liability-creating 
conduct that causes latent bodily injury or property damage that then 
manifests itself only many years after the harm-causing conduct occurred. 
Exposure to asbestos, and the storage of hazardous waste that slowly leaches 
into an aquifer, are paradigm examples. Beginning about fifty years ago, 
long-tail liability and claims against liability insurers for insurance coverage 
of long-tail liability have generated the vast majority of cutting-edge issues 
facing these two related fields. It is precisely the length of the tail on certain 
tort claims that is responsible for most of the fundamental developments in 
these fields over the past fifty years. Without long-tail liability, tort and 
insurance law, and many of the fundamental structural features of these 
fields, would look today much like they looked fifty years ago, and indeed, 
fifty years before that. But because of long-tail liability, features of both fields 
that simply did not exist fifty years ago are now central to these fields.  
Almost all of this involved common law change. In an era dominated 
legally by federal legislation and the administrative state, the long-tail 
liability revolution was the exceptional instance in which judge-made, state-
law rules governing tort law and insurance were central. The long-tail 
liability revolution took decades to occur, largely because it occurred 
through the common law process. It is also an example of what the legal 
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system may face in the 21st century, if and when common law litigation over 
injury and loss caused by many new technologies that are coming onto the 
current scene begins to occur. This Article is an effort to understand how the 
long-tail liability revolution occurred, by analyzing the influence of this new 
form of liability on tort and insurance law, as well as the consequences that 
these changes in the law have produced. 
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Very few developments have ever transformed either tort or insurance 
law, although there is a handful of them.1 One development, and only one, 
has transformed both tort and insurance law. And that development has taken 
place with little recognition that it has played a central role in these 
transformations. This is the rise of long-tail civil liability.  
 A long-tail claim involves tortious or other liability-creating conduct 
that causes latent bodily injury or property damage that then manifests itself 
only many years, and sometimes decades, after the harm-causing conduct 
occurred.2 Exposure to asbestos and the storage of hazardous waste that 
slowly leaches into an aquifer are paradigm examples. Beginning about fifty 
years ago, long-tail liability and claims against liability insurers for insurance 
 
1 The major such developments are as follows. First, beginning around 1850, accident law 
went from being a mix of strict liability and negligence liability to being based predominantly 
on negligence. The seminal case on the issue is Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 
(1850). Second, between 1910 and 1920, the adoption of workers’ compensation removed 
employers’ liability from tort and replaced it with an administrative compensation scheme. 
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 52–57 (2008) (hereinafter THE LIABILITY CENTURY). Third, in 
the mid-1960s, the rise of strict products liability took the negligence standard out of the 
picture in this field, although (it turned out) not to the extent originally envisioned. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1997) (describing the 
rationale for the strict liability standard); Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., 
Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 733–34 (1992) 
(describing products liability developments); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791–802 (1966) (recounting the 
developments that led to the adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A). Finally, 
developments in the insurance markets led to the promulgation of a Comprehensive General 
Liability (CGL) insurance policy in 1940, fully standardizing business liability insurance for 
the first time. See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra, at 155 (describing the 1940 CGL as “the 
first modern business liability insurance policy”). It would be a struggle to find other 
plausible examples of transformations of this magnitude in either field. 
2 See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 152–57 (defining the “long-tail” problem as 
one that results from products and environmental torts causing “injury or damage that occurs 
gradually, out of sight, and away from the defendant.”). 




coverage of long-tail liability have generated the vast majority of the cutting-
edge issues facing these two related fields of law.3 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the impact of the rise of long-tail 
liability on the two fields. In tort, and in the allied field of environmental 
liability, long-tail liability generated the very phenomenon of the mass tort; 
produced statistically-based forms of settlement and the advent of the 
“settlement fund” that served as a model for the September 11 and Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill funds; caused the courts to develop radical new doctrines 
governing causation; and was the basis for the several hundred-billion dollar 
Superfund regime of retroactive, strict, and joint and several corporate 
liability for environmental cleanup costs.  
At the same time, liability insurance for long-tail liability produced 
an insurance “crisis” of such significance that it made the cover of Time 
Magazine; an antitrust suit by nineteen states against the insurance industry, 
alleging a conspiracy involving insurance of long-tail liability, went all the 
way to the Supreme Court and yielded the seminal rule governing the 
insurance industry’s cooperative preparation of standard-form insurance 
policies; and the courts created not only a whole new body of insurance law 
doctrines but also new concepts such as the “trigger” of coverage and the 
“allocation” of coverage responsibility among multiple triggered policies.  
The new insurance law doctrines came close to bankrupting Lloyd’s of 
London and caused the introduction of two new forms of insurance coverage. 
 Nothing comparable to the number and magnitude of these 
developments has ever influenced tort and insurance law in such far-reaching 
ways. Yet, for all the analysis of individual developments in long-tail 
liability4 and insurance coverage of such liability5 that has been produced 
 
3 The one exception is the partial shift to strict liability for product defects that occurred 
around 1965. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
4 Some of the major works on individual issues associated with long-tail liability in tort 
include Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 
68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure 
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Mark J. 
Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Steven Shavell, 
Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 19 J.L. & ECON. 587 
(1985); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management 
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A 
Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992); Heidi Li Feldman, 
Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1995); Roger C. 
Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An 
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995); Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of 
Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2 (2019).  
5 Some of the major works on individual issues associated with long-tail liability insurance 
include Robert D. Chesler, Michael L. Rodburg & Cornelius C. Smith, Jr., Patterns of 
Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 18 
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over the last several decades, there has been no effort to describe and assess 
the overall character and influence of long-tail liability on the law of torts and 
insurance, let alone the consequences of long-tail liability that extend far 
beyond legal doctrine. In my view, separate subject-matter silos—especially 
the stark divide between tort law and insurance law scholarship—have been 
a major obstacle to seeing the long-tail liability phenomenon as a whole.6 
This Article is an effort to bridge that divide and to engage in a combined 
analysis of many seemingly disparate developments in tort and insurance that 
are in fact closely related. 
 These developments were able to occur only because of the 
confluence of a number of factors. The industrial activity of the first half of 
the 20th century, along with the chemical and pharmaceutical revolutions of 
mid-century,7 generated bodily injury, disease, and pollution-related property 
damage that involved long-latent harm. This led to long-tail liability, and to 
claims for insurance coverage of that liability. But long-tail liability would 
have been non-existent or stunted if science and medicine in the second half 
of the 20th century had not become capable, at least some of the time, of 
identifying the causes of that harm. These advances made litigation over 
liability feasible, for without scientific and medical evidence of causation, 
many, perhaps most, suits alleging long-tail liability would never have been 
brought. Ironically, then, both the causes of the harms at issue in long-tail 
liability actions, and the legal system’s capacity to address them, were 
grounded in the technological and scientific advances of the time. 
 Yet all this took place in an institutional context heavily influenced 
and constrained by judicial federalism. The rise of the “administrative state,” 
 
RUTGERS L.J. 9 (1986); E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause 
Through the Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental 
Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1988); Jordan S. Stanzler & 
Charles A. Yuen, Coverage for Environmental Cleanup Costs: History of the Word 
“Damages” in the Standard Form Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 1990 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 449; Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability 
Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1997); Kenneth S. Abraham, 
The Maze of Mega-Coverage Litigation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2102 (1997) [hereinafter 
Abraham, Mega-Coverage Litigation]; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage 
Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 349 (2006); Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 
128 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the “Absolute” 
Exclusion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & 
INS. L.J. 1 (1998); Christopher C. French, The “Non-Cumulation Clause”: An “Other 
Insurance” Clause by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375 (2011). 
6 For discussion of this scholarly divide, see THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
7 See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SHAPING THE INDUSTRIAL CENTURY: THE 
REMARKABLE STORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN CHEMICAL AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES (2005) (documenting developments in high-technology 
industries from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century). 




and the centralization of regulatory authority in administrative agencies, 
mostly at the federal level, has been recognized in legal scholarship and 
public discourse for decades.8 Significantly, however, the fields of tort and 
insurance law are almost entirely matters of state law, and of state common 
law at that. Neither federal legislation nor regulation stepped in to deal with 
long-tail harm or long-tail liability. They left the common law to deal with 
these problems.  
 The long-tail liability revolution is therefore a significant example of 
the way that the common law, operating inside the administrative state but 
outside of any actual administrative regulation, dealt with a new, major, 
system-wide challenge. The decentralized common law system developed 
ways of coping with long-tail injury, disease, and property damage. But a 
major aspect of the developments chronicled here is that it took a long time—
half a century, really—for the common law to cope with these developments. 
This was partly a function of the complexity of the many issues that long-tail 
tort and insurance coverage litigation generated. Judicial decisions made 
issue-by-issue and case-by-case do not produce a fully-formed body of 
doctrine in a mere year or two. But the time it took all of this to develop was 
also a function of the fact that the sources of legal authority were a large 
number of separate and independent state courts, as well as federal courts 
applying state law. The bottom-up character of that kind of common law 
development, and the cross-state harmonization that was required for 
coherence eventually to evolve, inevitably meant that the process would take 
decades to reach maturity.  
 This Article is an effort to understand how all this occurred by 
analyzing the influence of long-tail liability on tort law and insurance law and 
the consequences that these changes in the law have produced. The Article 
argues that it is precisely the length of the tail on certain tort claims that is 
responsible for so many of the fundamental developments in these fields over 
the past fifty years. Without long-tail liability, tort and insurance law, and 
many of the fundamental structural features of these fields, would look today 
much like they looked fifty years ago, and indeed, fifty years before that. But 
 
8 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 574 (1984) (describing the structure and 
increasing power of federal administrative agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes 
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 408–09 (1989) (detailing the demand for 
administrative agencies through the New Deal and social movements of the twentieth 
century); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) 
(recounting the history of presidential control over administrative agencies); J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, Assessing the Administrative State, 32 J.L. & POL. 239, 243 (2017) (describing 
the complex regulatory landscape of administrative institutions); Gillian E. Metzger, The 
Supreme Court, 2016 Term – Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under 
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (pointing to the Obama-era expansion of the regulatory 
state as the immediate trigger for the anti-regulatory actions of the Trump presidency). 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [March 2021 
 
   
 
352 
because of long-tail liability, features of both fields that simply did not exist 
fifty years ago are now central to these fields. 
 Part I begins the analysis by recounting the rise of long-tail liability, 
and by examining the three characteristic and challenging features of long-
tail liability: the sheer scale of the cases that results from the massive numbers 
of claimants that are often involved; the economically high stakes for both 
the claimants as a group and for the defendant; and the tendency of long-tail 
claims to pose vexing issues of causation, largely because of the length of 
time between the occurrence of tortious conduct and the manifestation of 
injury or damage allegedly resulting from that conduct. The rise of this form 
of liability produced changes in the way that tort litigation is handled and 
causation is proved. It also led to the enactment of the federal Superfund 
environmental cleanup program. 
 Next, Part II describes the revolution in insurance law generated by 
claims for coverage of long-tail liability. This revolution involved protracted 
litigation over the development of new doctrines governing coverage 
responsibility among dozens or even hundreds of liability insurers that issued 
liability insurance policies potentially covering a particular long-tail liability, 
as well as the highly divisive controversy over insurance against liability for 
environmental pollution that figured in this litigation. 
 Finally, Part III identifies a series of significant consequences of these 
events that are now structural features of tort law, insurance law, law practice 
in these fields, and the insurance markets: the century-long expansion of tort 
liability for accidental bodily injury and property damage experienced a sharp 
deceleration; the first tort reform statutes of general application ever enacted 
became law in nearly every state; Lloyd’s of London’s general liability 
insurance operation nearly collapsed and had to be restructured; a new form 
of liability insurance, the Bermuda policy, came into being; and major 
corporations came to rely more heavily on self-insurance then they ever had 
done before. 
 The long-tail liability revolution was a creature of the 20th century. 
But 21st century technologies that produce new kinds of physical, economic, 
or emotional harm – cyber-invasions of privacy, the coming use of gene 
therapy in medicine, malfunctioning facial recognition software, collisions of 
driverless cars,9 artificial intelligence, and accidents involving any number of 
other now-manual functions that will become automated, for example – are 
starting to or will generate civil litigation and be subject to insurance. The 
lesson of decades of long-tail litigation is that the liability rules, and the 
insurance mechanisms that may cushion against these new forms of potential 
 
9 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer 
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127, 128 
(2019) (providing an overview of legal questions raised by future use of automated vehicles). 




and actual liability, are not necessarily going to be adequate to meet the 
challenges that the new technologies pose. Yet another major set of 
transformations may therefore be in the offing.  
That process is likely to take place at least partly, and perhaps largely, 
through the same kind of common law development that characterized the 
long-tail liability revolution. The administrative state is unlikely to be heavily 
involved, if the past, and the current national political climate, are any guide. 
The developments I will recount show that common law tort and insurance 
transformations of major scope take decades to occur and may be fully visible 
only in retrospect. If and when tort and insurance transformations involving 
twenty-first century technologies proceed, we can therefore expect the 
transformations to last a lifetime before they are completed. 
 Whatever the future brings, one thing is clear: the changes that long-
tail liability generated are now such regular features of the law and practice 
in these fields that they may appear always to have been in place, and always 
to have been influential. But in fact, the history of these fields over the last 
half-century demonstrates that, in a very real sense, long-tail liability changed 
everything. This Article tells the story of that change. 
  
I. THE RISE OF LONG-TAIL LIABILITY 
 
 In the pre-long-tail world of liability for accidental bodily injury and 
property damage, there was essentially one kind of tort claim. This involved 
a sporadic accident that caused immediately discernable physical harm to an 
individual or small number of individuals, or to their property. Even the 
exceptions—explosions,10 fires,11 bursting dams,12 airplane crashes13—were 
exceptional only because they involved injury to more than just a few people. 
They were abruptly-occurring mass disasters. In the case of these larger 
accidents, the same legal doctrines and practices that would have applied and 
been followed in a tort claim where only a single individual had been injured 
still applied to each individual’s claim. Thus, the profile of all tort claims was 
essentially the same.14  
 
10 See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 23 (1953) (involving the explosion of 
fertilizer on a ship that killed 581 people). 
11 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 103 A.2d 
805, 805 (Conn. 1954) (involving a circus tent fire that killed 169 people). 
12 See, e.g., GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 3 (2d ed. 2008) (recounting 
the litigation involving the collapse of a dam that killed 118 people). 
13 See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 497 F. Supp. 313, 315 
(D.D.C. 1980) (involving the crash of a passenger airliner).  
14 In conventional product liability, there is a minor version of the long tail. Some time always 
passes between the sale of the product and the occurrence of injury. Whether a product defect 
or something else caused the injury in question is sometimes more open to question than in 
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 A different form of claim began to arise, however, with harm caused 
by non-durable products such as drugs, and other substances such as 
chemicals and waste, that have the potential to cause disease or illness rather 
than violent injury. Individuals exposed to these drugs or chemicals can 
contract diseases without knowing it, sometimes without knowing it for a 
considerable period of time. Similarly, below-ground property damage 
caused by pollution can occur but go undiscovered for long periods after it 
begins. When disease or property damage has been latent for a long period, 
it may be difficult to prove what caused it and when it first occurred. 
 The first, comparatively contained, long-tail cases involving latent 
disease of this sort appeared in the 1960s.15 Shortly thereafter, however, came 
the most massive long-tail tort cases ever brought— asbestos cases.16 
Exposure to asbestos may cause near-immediate lung injury, but such injury 
typically does not manifest in recognizable symptoms for several decades. 
The first asbestos plaintiffs had been exposed to this substance at least as 
early as the 1930s.17 In the last five decades there have been more than 
 
non-products cases. The longer the time between sale and the accident, the greater the 
probability that one of these other factors, and not a defect, was responsible. And unlike 
manufacturing defect cases, which tend to be highly sporadic and one-off, the same problem 
can recur in case after case involving design or warning liability. Nonetheless, this kind of 
causal uncertainty did not prompt, and seems never to have prompted, serious proposals for 
modifying the rules governing proof of causation in cases involving durable products. This 
is probably because the problem is always present in principle, but infrequently present in 
practice. Whether a defect or something else caused an accident or injury is usually 
susceptible to traditional methods of proof, including modern accident reconstruction 
techniques. And when such proof is not available, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur often 
enables the plaintiff’s case to go to the jury. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. 
LIAB. §§ 3, 115 (AM. L. INST. 1997) (providing the requirements for drawing an inference of 
negligence under the res ipsa loquitor doctrine).  
15 The earliest prominent example involved MER/29, an anti-cholesterol drug that was shown 
to cause cataracts. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 
1967) (describing the MER/29 suits and the issues they posed); Paul D. Rheingold, The 
MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116, 
116, 121–22 (1968) (describing the mass litigation of MER/29 cases in the 1960s). There 
were about 1500 federal and state suits involving this drug filed in different jurisdictions. Id. 
at 121. Plaintiffs’ counsel cooperated in a variety of ways prior to the trials that were held, 
including on joint discovery, presaging the method in which much mass tort litigation would 
proceed in ensuing decades. Id. at 121–22, 125, 127.  
16 The earliest appellate decision involving the first wave of asbestos cases was Borel v. 
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. 493 F.2d 1076, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973). Suit in the case was filed 
in 1969, and there was a jury verdict in 1971. Robert Q. Keith & Robert J. Robertson, Borel v. 
Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, TEX. STATE HIST. ASS’N: HANDBOOK OF TEX., 
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/borel-v-fibreboard-paper-products-corporation 
[https://perma.cc/KRR5-GLN5]. 
17 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083–84. 




700,000 claims alleging bodily injury caused by exposure to asbestos.18 
Diagnosing asbestos-related lung disease (asbestosis), or a rare cancer variant 
(mesothelioma) does not pose difficult problems of proof. But as we will see 
below, issues of causation still often arise because many claimants have been 
exposed to asbestos from multiple sources.  
 In the years that followed, a series of other mass tort cases were 
brought and many continue to be brought. Many of these involved 
comparatively new drugs and useful chemicals—for example, DES,19 the 
Dalkon Shield,20 Agent Orange,21 and Bendectin.22 Others involved 
hazardous waste.23 In each instance, there was a long-tail between exposure 
to the drug or substance and the manifestation of alleged disease or injury. 
The pharmaceutical and chemical revolutions of the twentieth century were 
responsible not only for the harms at issue, but also in many instances for the 
evidence that made it possible for mass tort cases to be instituted.24 Only 
because twentieth century science and medicine were able to point to the 
drugs and chemicals at the heart of each case as being responsible, or 
potentially responsible, for the injuries and diseases for which the plaintiffs 
sought to hold the defendants liable could these mass tort cases have any 
chance of success. 
 
18 Daniel King, Asbestos Manufacturers (Mar. 1, 2021), ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos. 
com/companies/ [https://perma.cc/Z2AN-QGHY]. This was a 2002 estimate; the current 
number is probably close to one million claims. 
19 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys, 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980) (explaining that 
diethylstilbesterol (DES) was administered to the plaintiffs’ mothers for preventing 
miscarriage and was later linked to cancerous growths in daughters exposed in utero). 
20 See., e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 
1188, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (involving a class action lawsuit raised by thousands of women 
who alleged they were injured by a defective intrauterine device). 
21 See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1051–52 (E.D.N.Y. 
1982) (reviewing liability for harm caused by Agent Orange, an herbicide used by the 
government in Southeast Asia). 
22 See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 301–02 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(presenting the claim that Bendectin, a prescription drug intended to alleviate morning 
sickness in pregnant women, caused birth defects). 
23 See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Twp., 525 A.2d 287, 291 (N.J. 1987) (considering an appeal of 
judgment in favor of residents who sued township for damages from drinking contaminated 
well water). 
24 Another species of suit that sometime bears a resemblance to mass tort is the public 
nuisance action seeking damages for remedying a long-latent danger posed by such 
substances as lead paint. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 
434 (R.I. 2008) (hearing a lawsuit raised on behalf of the state of Rhode Island against 
manufacturers of lead paint and their trade association). Because many of the liability issues 
in such suits differ from those posed in tort actions, I set these aside, although it is worth 
noting that the liability insurance issues that such cases pose resemble those posed by mass 
tort liability insurance claims. 
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 Then pollution liability came into the picture. In 1978, residents at a 
housing development at Love Canal, near Niagara Falls, New York, 
discovered that hazardous waste long buried under the area was leaking into 
their basements. A prolonged national controversy focused on this particular 
site, but subsequent investigation revealed that there were actually thousands 
of hazardous waste deposit sites around the country posing or with the 
potential to pose hazards to health and the environment.25 These sites almost 
all involved long-tail harms, since it turned out that they often had been 
leaking pollutants, and contaminating groundwater and property, for decades.  
In December 1980, the lame-duck Congress responded by adopting 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”).26 Nicknamed the Superfund Act, the legislation was 
directed at cleanup, or “remediation,” of sites where hazardous substances 
(most often waste) posed an environmental health risk. The scope of 
CERCLA liability for environmental cleanup was unprecedented. Any party 
who had been associated with a site as an owner, operator, or generator of waste 
deposited there was subject to a rigorous regime of retroactive, strict, and joint 
and several liability for the sometimes enormous cost of environmental 
cleanup.27 Under CERCLA, a responsible corporate party could be held liable 
for tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in environmental cleanup costs, 
arising out of activities in which it and other corporations had engaged, 
sometimes as long ago as the late nineteenth century.28  
 The following sections discuss how cases involving long-tail injury, 
disease, property damage, and environmental pollution tend to share a 
number of other characteristics that have corresponding and similar 
consequences. First, the massive scale of these cases often is a product of the 
long-tail harms they involve, and this massive scale generates methods of 
litigation and settlement that are collective rather than individual. Their 
massiveness makes doing individual justice in such cases difficult. Second, 
the cases tend to involve very high stakes, because of the amount of money at 
risk. For this reason as well, the cases tend eventually to be settled rather than 
litigated to a judgment, because both private plaintiffs and private defendants 
are risk-averse. Third, long-tail claims often pose quintessentially difficult 
 
25 The story of the Love Canal as told from the standpoint of one of the participants can be 
found in LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL AND THE BIRTH OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
MOVEMENT 19–21 (2011). 
26 Codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9674. 
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606–07; ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. 
BUZBEE, DANIEL R. MANDELKER & DANIEL BODANSKY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
LAW AND POLICY 875–77 (6th ed. 2011). 
28 CERCLA liability was challenged, in this respect and others, as being unconstitutionally 
retroactive, but the challenges were quickly rejected. See, e.g., State ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff, 
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1302, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (rejecting defendant’s statutory interpretation 
argument that congressional intent weighs against retroactive application of CERCLA). 




causation questions, largely because of the length of time between the 
defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct and the manifestation of injury, disease, 
or damage that may have been caused by that conduct. All three characteristics 
combined to help change the nature of litigation over long-tail harm. 
 
A. Massive Scale 
 
 Perhaps the single most significant characteristic of long-tail claims 
is that so many of them involve large numbers of claimants.29 This is no 
surprise. The longer the tail, the more difficult it is likely to be to connect past 
conduct with present harm. If exposure to a particular substance causes a 
disease that manifests itself in only a few unrelated people twenty years later, 
it is extremely unlikely that anyone would ever be able to identify a causal 
connection between exposure of these few individuals to the substance and 
their contracting the same disease many years later. A pattern emerges only 
when there is a large number of parties suffering a particular kind of harm, 
and the characteristic these parties have in common is then recognized to be 
past exposure to a particular substance or form of conduct. The pattern and 
the causal connections the pattern reflects may be identified through rigorous 
epidemiology, as was the case with asbestos,30 or through less formal 
investigation and recognition.31 
 A second reason that the large scale of many long-tail cases is no 
surprise is that the cost of bringing small-scale cases often would be 
prohibitive. The economies of scale that are available to plaintiffs’ counsel 
when a large number of individuals is harmed make it more cost-effective to 
bring such cases, especially when identification and subsequent proof of 
 
29 One commentator has characterized mass torts generally as having the characteristics of 
large numbers of claimants, geographic and temporal diversity, and similar factual patterns: 
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT xii–xxiii (2007). For 
Nagareda’s purposes, this appears to include both short-tail and long-tail claims but to 
exclude abrupt disasters that injure large numbers of people at the same time and place. 
30 See Irving J. Selikoff, Jacob Churg & E. Cuyler Hammond, Asbestos Exposure and 
Neoplasia, 188 JAMA 142, 142 (1964) (studying the incidence of death due to lung cancer 
among workers in asbestos-producing industries). 
31 Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin 
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1993) (identifying different methods of proving 
causation); Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1011, 1012 (2001) (discussing how to determine whether a substance is hazardous for 
the purpose of legal causation); David E. Bernstein, Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort 
Cases, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 51, 69 (2008) (asserting that modern rules of evidence limit the 
admissibility of expert testimony to prove causation unsupported by underlying studies). 
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causation are expensive because they depend on substantial scientific 
investigation.32 
 Massiveness also facilitates cooperation among counsel for different 
plaintiffs and various forms of consolidated procedure that reduce the per 
claim cost of litigation and thereby make it more feasible for plaintiffs’ 
counsel to withstand defense efforts to raise the cost of litigation for 
plaintiffs. These include class action certification,33 multi-district 
consolidation, jointly-conducted discovery, and the use of test cases for 
trial.34 These devices were little used or unknown in tort cases before the 
advent of long-tail claims. The devices are now a routine feature of many tort 
suits involving large numbers of claims, including claims that do not involve 
long-tail liability.35  
 Finally, the massive scale of many long-tail cases makes it a virtual 
necessity to develop formal or informal facilities to process the settlement of 
cases that do not, and as a practical matter cannot, go to trial.36 Claimants 
must be categorized, based mainly on the seriousness of their alleged injuries, 
but also sometimes based on other factors, so that their claims can be 
processed efficiently.37 Although conventional tort cases rarely go to trial, 
refusing to settle and demanding one’s day in court is still theoretically 
 
32 In the MER/29 cases, plaintiffs’ counsel cooperated pre-trial in a variety of ways, including 
on joint discovery, presaging the method in which much mass tort litigation would proceed 
in ensuing decades. See Rheingold, supra note 15, at 121–30 (describing the importance of 
massive pre-trial discovery that came with consolidating the MER/29 cases). 
33 There are now substantial barriers to bringing mass tort suits as class actions, but these 
were only erected in the late 1990s. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
594, 622 (1997) (overturning lower court’s finding that asbestos plaintiffs met predominance 
requirement for class certification); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999) 
(rejecting class certification for failure to demonstrate limited fund treatment); Charles 
Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1357, 1420–21 (2003) (discussing the economy of class actions to mass torts). 
34 See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 
667 (1989) (identifying early uses of test cases, multiple juries, collateral estoppel, and 
consolidation); Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 
495, 499 (1991) (noting the important differences between consolidated suits and class actions). 
35 McGovern, supra note 34, at 688–94 (advocating for a “hybrid process” of case 
consolidation that could apply to all mass tort cases). 
36 See Ian Ayres, Optimal Pooling in Claims Resolution Facilities, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
159, 161–65 (1990) (suggesting a possible model for settlement of claims); Francis E. 
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1365 
(2005) (“The tort paradigm, for example, is of one or more defendants being held liable to 
an individual . . . . In tort cases involving large numbers of plaintiffs, this model is generally 
a fiction . . . .”). 
37 McGovern, supra note 36, at 1372 (identifying methods for assessing damages); Deborah 
R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-
Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1048–52 (1993) (explaining the conflicting interests 
of opposing parties in mass litigation). 




possible for plaintiffs in such cases. That is a virtual impossibility in cases 
with massive numbers of plaintiffs. They have access only to what amounts 
to court-supervised administrative compensation. 
 Devising and administering long-tail mass tort claim settlement 
facilities has become a sophisticated art. The individuals who serve as special 
masters or fund administrators have therefore been called upon to apply their 
skills to administer compensation funds in other settings that draw upon tort 
compensation funds as models for their operation. Kenneth Feinberg, for 
example, began by administering mass tort compensation funds, and then 
became a prominent public figure when he directed the 9/11 and Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill funds.38  
 
B. High Stakes 
 
 The sheer number of plaintiffs—thousands or even tens of 
thousands—in many long-tail tort cases means that the cases pose the 
potential for hundreds of millions of dollars of liability, or more. Early in the 
history of asbestos litigation, Manville Corporation (formerly Johns Manville), 
one of the major historical makers of asbestos-containing insulation, was 
driven into bankruptcy in 1982 by the liabilities it faced.39 A.H. Robbins, 
maker of the Dalkon Shield IUD, faced so many suits alleging it was liable for 
punitive damages that in 1985 it too sought bankruptcy protection.40 
 Superfund liability usually involves only federal or state 
governmental plaintiffs, although at multiparty sites such as landfills there 
may be hundreds of responsible parties who are defendants. But regardless 
of the number of parties, soon after CERCLA was enacted, the monetary 
stakes turned out to be enormous. Cleanup costs at a major site could easily 
exceed $100 million.41 Within a few years, the projected cost of cleanup of 
 
38 See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO 
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 28–54 (2006) (describing the author’s experience as 
special master of the 9/11 fund); KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR 
COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL xiv–xviii (2012) (describing 
the importance of the author’s work on the 9/11 fund as a factor in his later selection to 
administer the Deepwater Horizon fund). 
39 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 424–26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (adjudicating 
the bankruptcy of the Manville Corporation largely attributed to asbestos health litigation). 
40 A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1986) (adjudicating the 
bankruptcy of A.H. Robins Company, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, noting the millions 
of dollars spent in defense litigation related to harms caused by the IUD device.) 
41 As of 1989, the average cost to remedy hazardous conditions at a site was $30 million. Kenneth 
S. Abraham, Cleaning Up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 
603 (1993) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-90-22, SUPERFUND: A 
MORE VIGOROUS AND BETTER MANAGED ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IS NEEDED 2 (1989)). 
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sites nationwide was several hundred billion dollars.42 As of 2003, the EPA 
calculated that it had assessed risks at over 44,000 sites, that remediation had 
been conducted at 7399 sites, and that 11,000 sites remained active.43 
The high cost of cleanup turned on a number of factors, but the most 
important factor was that the principal cost of cleanup often involved 
decontamination of groundwater—water in underground aquifers. Unlike 
contaminated soil, which can be excavated, groundwater typically is 
decontaminated by pumping the water out of the ground and treating it. Thirty 
years or more may be necessary to accomplish decontamination when 
groundwater underlying many square miles of property has been 
contaminated.44  
Two consequences of the high stakes in long-tail cases should be 
emphasized. First, in many mass tort cases, neither plaintiffs nor defendants 
could afford to risk everything by trying cases, even setting aside the 
administrative infeasibility of doing so. The certainty provided by settlement, 
even for an enormous sum in the aggregate, was preferable to the risk posed 
by not settling.45 As noted above, rather than litigate, A.H. Robins entered 
Chapter 11 and established a $2.8 billion fund to compensate women who 
were injured by its Dalkon Shield intrauterine device.46 And in the Superfund 
context, there was almost always what amounted to settlement. Responsible 
parties’ liability was so nearly certain that negotiations were over such 
 
42 See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 151 (referring to cleanup cost estimates of 
$500 billion). A more partisan but nonetheless representative estimate was that there were 
36,000 sites requiring cleanup and that the cost of cleanups under Superfund and related 
programs would exceed $750 billion. HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP PROJECT, STICKER 
SHOCK: RECOGNIZING THE FULL COST OF SUPERFUND CLEANUPS iii (1993), https://p2info 
house.org/ref/33/32340.pdf [https://perma.cc/M64W-BZ3L]. 
43 MARK REISCH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IB10114, BROWNFIELDS AND SUPERFUND ISSUES IN 
THE 108TH CONGRESS 6 (2004). 
44 See Linly Ferris & David Rees, CERCLA Remedy Selection: Abandoning the Quick Fix 
Mentality, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 785, 832 (1994) (citing estimates that it could take 100 to 1000 
years to completely decontaminate an aquifer by the pump and treat method). 
45 Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 952–
56 (1996) (discussing breast implant settlements); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: 
A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 89 (1998) (“[T]he substantial weight of the scientific 
evidence fails to support the conclusion that Bendectin causes birth defects . . . .”); MICHAEL 
D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 207–11 (1996) (describing how uncertainty in toxic substance 
cases often impedes settlement until bankruptcy proceedings). 
46 See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
79, 100–104 (1990) (describing the outcome of the Dalkon Shield cases, including the 
creation of an over $2 billion claimants trust); George Rutherglen, Distributing Justice: The 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and the Legacy of the Dalkon Shield Claimants 
Trust, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 673, 674–75 (2005) (citing the Dalkon Shield Claimants 
Trust as a model for the 9/11 Fund). 




matters as the choice of cleanup remedy and the relative responsibilities of 
multiple parties.47 The plaintiff—usually the EPA—held all the cards. 
Second, many defendants paid so much to settle their liabilities that it 
made sense for them to invest considerable sums to finance litigation of their 
claims for insurance coverage against their historic CGL insurers. The 
amount of money involved in long-tail civil liability therefore made it 
virtually inevitable that, after resolution of the underlying long-tail tort or 
CERCLA liabilities, there would follow high-stakes insurance coverage 
litigation between the defendant/policyholders and their many insurers. 
 
C. Difficult Causation Issues 
 
 One of the more challenging features of many long-tail cases involves 
proving causation. The longer the tail, the greater the possibility that, rather 
than the defendant’s having caused the plaintiffs’ harm, some causal force 
operating subsequent to the time of the defendant’s conduct is responsible for 
some or all of that harm.48 Cases involving long-tail liability have produced 
most of the innovative doctrines governing proof of causation that are now 
part of the common law of torts. 
 Plaintiffs in long-tail cases face the challenge of proving both 
“general” and “specific” causation. That is, there must be proof both that the 
substance for which the defendant is the source can cause the disease in 
question (general causation), and that this substance did cause the disease in 
question in a particular plaintiff (specific causation).49 This poses the problem 
of the “indeterminate plaintiff.” Plaintiffs often also face the challenge of 
 
47 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, ROBERT L. GRAHAM, LISA 
HEINZERLING, DAVID A. WIRTH & NOAH D. HALL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: 
NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 724 (4th ed. 2010) (“For many lawyers representing PRPs, the 
problem is less one of environmental law than it is one of engaging in strategic behavior to 
minimize both the amount spent on cleanups and the share of the cleanup cost allocated to 
their clients.”). 
48 In two important long-tail areas this problem has not arisen because the plaintiffs have 
suffered a “signature” disease. That is, the plaintiffs have diseases that are only caused by 
exposure to a particular substance. In the DES cases, this was vaginal adenocarcinoma. See 
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 144 (5th ed. 2017) 
(describing plaintiffs’ argument that vaginal adenocarcinoma “could be caused only by 
exposure to DES” such that “if the plaintiff had that disease, then it was caused by DES”). 
There was also a strong and established connection between exposure to asbestos and lung 
disease. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(detailing how prolonged exposure to asbestos and the subsequent manifestation of the lung 
disease, asbestosis, can be accurately understood as a continuing tort). There are few 
signature diseases, however, and these are the only long-tail signature diseases that have 
figured in litigation. 
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c 
(AM. L. INST. 2005). 
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identifying the particular defendant responsible for their particular injury or 
disease.50 This is the problem of the “indeterminate defendant.” 
 
1. The indeterminate defendant 
 
 The area where the challenges posed by the causation element in long-
tail claims has produced the most significant doctrinal innovations involves 
identifying which of a number of parties actually caused a particular plaintiff’s 
injury or disease—the problem of the “indeterminate defendant.”51 That is, 
sometimes both general and specific “substance causation” are proved, but 
proving the identity of the party or parties responsible for the substance that 
caused harm to any particular plaintiff is a challenge. 
  For example, over a period of decades, many enterprises made or used 
asbestos-containing products; plaintiffs may have difficulty proving the 
particular source of their exposure, or may have been exposed to asbestos 
from more than one source. Similarly, more than one company marketed the 
anti-miscarriage drug, DES. Plaintiffs in the DES cases, who were the daughters 
of women who had taken DES while they were pregnant and given birth to 
babies who eventually developed cancer, were almost always unable to identify 
the company that had sold the DES taken years earlier by their mothers.52 
 Beginning with the Borel asbestos case in 1973,53 the courts 
addressed the problem of the indeterminate defendant by relaxing the 
traditional requirement that the plaintiff prove the portion of his or her total 
injury caused by each negligent or otherwise-liable defendant.54 All 
defendants responsible for a significant exposure of the plaintiff to asbestos 
were held jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s disease.55 The 
traditional requirement had already been supplanted in many conventional 
injury cases, with a rule that shifted the burden of apportionment to 
defendants and imposed joint and several liability only if they failed to satisfy 
 
50 Id. 
51 See LINDA S. MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1062–66 (2d 
ed. 2008) (providing an overview of the indeterminate defendant problem in mass torts). 
52 Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys, 607 P.2d 924, 926–28 (Cal. 1980). 
53 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
54 Id. at 1103. 
55 For a discussion of the impact of this approach, see Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive 
Proof-of-Causation Doctrines Central to Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1013–
17 (2009) (describing the tendency of the courts post-Borel to hold any defendant responsible 
for significant early asbestos exposure in a plaintiff jointly and severally liable for the 
plaintiff’s total harm). Indeed, the logic of this doctrine leads to the conclusion that for 
practical purposes, what the plaintiff must prove is only that the defendant exposed the 
plaintiff to the risk of contracting asbestosis. Id. at 1029. 




that burden.56 But there was never any possibility of apportionment in most 
asbestos cases or in cases similar to it. The new approach imposed full 
liability on any defendant whose conduct had contributed to the plaintiff’s 
harm. That approach now applies across the board to long-tail and non-long-
tail cases alike.57 
 A second approach to the indeterminate defendant problem, adopted 
mainly in DES cases, was market-share liability.58 Under this doctrine, 
defendants who had sold DES during the period of exposure during the 
pregnancy of the plaintiff’s mother were held liable for the plaintiff’s damages 
in proportion to their market shares.59 Market-share liability has also been 
applied to a number of other substances.60 In addition, market-share liability 
has been a catalyst for academic writing about various forms of proportional 
liability. The thinking in this writing continues to percolate in the field.61 
 
56 See, e.g., Maddux v. Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Mich. 1961) (holding that the 
perceived injustice to the plaintiff victim outweighed the due process concerns of potentially 
holding two tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for an injury); Landers v. E. Tex. Salt 
Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. 1952) (holding that, where blame cannot be 
apportioned with reasonable certainty against defendant tortfeasors, the plaintiff is allowed 
to choose their method of recovery from one or more defendants under the doctrine of joint 
and several liability). 
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 
cmt. m. (AM. L. INST. 2005) (stating that, where a plaintiff can prove that exposure to any 
defendant’s product was a relevant contributing factor to the plaintiff’s injury, all relevant 
defendants may be held liable for the injury). 
58 The seminal case is Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
59 See, e.g., id. at 937 (“Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment 
represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the 
product which caused plaintiff’s injuries.”). 
60 See, e.g., Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 562–63 (Wis. 2005) 
(applying a “risk-contribution” theory to lead paint); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 
P.2d 717, 727 (Haw. 1991) (applying market-share liability to blood products). 
61 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 867 (advocating using market-share apportionment 
of liability in cases where it is unclear what firm in the market has caused a plaintiff’s injury);  
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving 
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1381 (1981) 
(criticizing market-share liability recovery as an unfair externalization of costs for enterprises 
under the modern tort system); Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and 
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 781 (1985) (discussing some 
academics’ support for more probabilistic apportionment of causal responsibility in tort, in 
contrast to an all-or nothing apportionment strategy); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 
MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1987) (advocating for a new method of proportional recovery 
under a “most likely victim” approach, limiting recovery to only those plaintiffs who can 
establish a high causal likelihood between their injury and the defendant’s product); Andrew 
R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1184–
1210 (1999) (advocating the position that pre-symptom, post-exposure plaintiffs should only 
be allowed to recover damages if they can prove exposure has at least doubled their risk of 
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2. The indeterminate plaintiff 
 
 The law governing proof of specific causation in cases involving 
tortiously-caused disease has undergone considerable development as a result 
of long-tail cases. This is because of what has sometimes been called the 
problem of the indeterminate plaintiff.62 If general causation is proved, but 
specific causation is uncertain because the cause of any particular plaintiff’s 
disease or injury may have been either the tortious conduct of the defendant 
or something else, which individuals who have experienced the disease fall 
into which category? For example, a certain percentage of women suffer from 
endometriosis.63 Women who used the Dalkon Shield IUD for birth control 
suffered from this condition at a higher rate than women in the general 
population. But some women who used the Dalkon Shield contracted 
endometriosis that the Dalkon Shield did not cause. Which women suffered 
from this condition because of the properties of that device, and which 
women did not? The longer the period between the time a defendant’s tortious 
conduct occurred and the time that a plaintiff’s injury or disease manifested 
itself, the greater the possibility that some other force, such as the conduct of 
another party, or the “natural” background occurrence of a disease such as 
endometriosis, is responsible for the plaintiff’s condition. 
 As a result of cases involving long-tail injury, the use of 
epidemiological and statistical forms of proof to address specific causation 
has become more common than in the past. For example, this sort of proof 
was used in the Agent Orange and Bendectin cases, though it seems not to 
 
disease); Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 963, 980–81 (2003) 
(discussing the practical implications of requiring firms to compensate victims for their 
injuries using a probabilistic, market-share liability approach); Allen Rostron, Beyond 
Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 153–54 (2004) (advocating for the abolition of the fungibility 
requirement of liability apportionment to recover under a theory of market-share liability). 
62 See, e.g., MULLENIX, supra note 51, at 1049–61 (providing an overview of the 
indeterminate plaintiff problem in mass torts). 
63 Endometriosis is a condition in which the endometrial cells that line the uterus grow 
outside the uterus, such as in the ovaries or fallopian tubes. Endometriosis, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/endometriosis/symptoms-causes/syc-
20354656 [https://perma.cc/B3WE-H47K]. A major allegation in the Dalkon Shield IUD 
litigation was that infections caused by the design of this device resulted in endometriosis in 
many of the women who used it, with consequent conditions involving difficulty in ovulation 
and conception. See, e.g., Setter v. A. H. Robins Co., 748 F.2d 1328, 1329 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(reviewing a negligence suit filed after plaintiff suffered injury from her use of the Dalkon 
Shield IUD); Gardiner v. A. H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(highlighting a separate lawsuit against A.H. Robbins filed after a plaintiff claimed to have 
suffered injury from use of the Dalkon Shield IUD).  




have risen to a sufficient level.64 This problem is even more severe in cases 
seeking compensation for disease caused by exposure to hazardous waste, 
because such waste is a mixture of numerous substances not a single, uniform 
chemical compound such as a drug or pesticide. The “substance” to which 
plaintiffs have been exposed therefore varies from waste site to waste site. 
Consequently, epidemiological proof is less likely to be available or 
sufficiently probative in such cases, because rates of disease are not 
necessarily comparable at different sites. 
 Nonetheless, disputes over the legitimacy of such forms of proof, and 
of the respectability of the experts who testify about it, characterized long-
tail claims almost from the beginning. And they have given rise to important 
precedents. Two of the most significant decisions from the Supreme Court 
on the admissibility of expert testimony addressing causation – one of them 
the now-central and much discussed Daubert case—arose out of long-tail tort 
claims.65 The standards articulated in these cases govern not only expert 
testimony in federal courts, but also at least by strong analogy in state courts 
that operate under rules of evidence highly similar to the federal rules. The 
standards for admissibility of expert testimony developed in these cases now 
govern generally in all cases, whether long-tail or conventional tort cases, and 
in all other civil cases as well. The problems of proving causation in long-tail 
liability cases gave birth to the standards.66 
 
* * * 
  
To sum up, over the last fifty years, long-tail injury and damage has 
given rise to a new kind of lawsuit, often involving massive numbers of 
claimants, high stakes, and difficult problems involving proof of causation. 
New practices and new legal doctrines have been generated as a result of this 
 
64 For a discussion of the implications of applying a statistical epidemiological threshold 
requirement for establishing causation, see GREEN, supra note 45, at 310–17. 
65 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 582–83 (1993) (involving birth 
defects allegedly caused by exposure in utero to the morning sickness drug Bendectin); Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139–40 (1997) (involving small-cell lung cancer allegedly 
caused by exposure to PCBs and other chemicals in dielectric fluid). 
66 Logically, the problems of the indeterminate plaintiff and the indeterminate defendant do 
not have to arise only in long-tail cases. Individuals can contract disease or suffer injury 
shortly after exposure to substances or conduct that may or may not actually have caused the 
injury or disease; and a plaintiff clearly injured or suffering disease as a result of recent 
exposure to a product or substance (e.g., toxic-shock syndrome) may be unable to identify 
the party responsible. But long-tail injury and disease claims generated the early cases that 
developed approaches to these problems, and then served as sources of thinking and doctrinal 
development in later, short-tail cases. If the long-tail claims had not existed, the new forms 
of thinking and doctrinal development might well never have occurred. 
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litigation, many of which affect not only long-tail litigation but tort liability 
in general. The old world of sporadic injury and the tort liability that governed 
it are now accompanied by a new world of long-tail liability and the 
innovative legal doctrines and procedures that accompany it. 
 
II. THE NEW WORLD OF INSURANCE LAW 
 
 Substantial as was the impact of long-tail claims on the development 
of tort law and tort litigation during the last fifty years, it cannot compare to 
the impact of this form of liability on insurance law and practice. Because of 
long-tail insurance coverage claims, the world of insurance law doctrine, 
practice, and the insurance markets moved from the sleepy backwater where 
they had long resided to a prominent place in the litigation universe.  
 Three developments, described in detail below, figure directly in the 
story. First, in 1966, the standard-form “CGL” insurance policy was revised 
to eliminate a long-running dispute about whether the standard policy 
covered liability for long-term hazardous exposure: it did. Within a few years, 
the new policy language left insurers highly vulnerable to claims for 
insurance coverage of bodily injury and property damage caused by 
pollution, at the very time when these kinds of claims were escalating. 
Second, within a few years, policyholders also began to make claims against 
their CGL insurers for coverage of the potentially enormous liabilities that 
they faced in the mass tort actions involving long-latent injury and disease 
resulting from drug and chemical exposures that were filed against them in 
the 1970s. Third, in 1980 CERCLA was enacted, and claims for coverage of 
liability for pollution cleanup under CERCLA—a wholly new form of 
liability—also were made.  
 The following Sections describe how, as a result of these 
developments, unprecedented levels of insurance litigation took place, 
involving billions of dollars of potential coverage responsibility, and the 
entire landscape of insurance law was transformed. Because insurance 
coverage law is state contract law, even when an underlying liability incurred 
by the policyholder is based on a federal cause of action (such as CERCLA), 
it was natural for divisions of authority on key questions to emerge. For many 
years there were many states without authoritative precedents governing key 
issues. As a result, decisions about where to bring suit, and the prediction of 
outcomes that was a predicate to such decisions, became crucial. Entire 
departments of major corporate law firms became dedicated to high-stakes 
insurance coverage litigation. Hundreds of judicial decisions around the 
country slowly yielded a series of new concepts and doctrines, addressing 




issues that had never before been envisioned, let alone resolved.67And 
eventually, as a consequence, new forms of liability insurance were 
introduced. The period from roughly 1980 to 2000 would be a watershed in 
the history of insurance law and practice, entirely remaking the field. 
 
A. The Occurrence-Based Liability Insurance Policy and the “Trigger” of 
Coverage 
 
 Businesses in the U.S. had long protected themselves against tort and 
other forms of civil liability by purchasing “CGL” (first “Comprehensive 
General Liability” and now “Commercial General Liability”) insurance. This 
form of insurance has been sold since 1941, and before that a policy that 
resembled it was sold.68 From then until now, the standard CGL policy insured 
businesses against liability for damages incurred “because of bodily injury and 
property damage.”69 The key to determining whether a policy at least 
potentially provided coverage was when the bodily injury or property damage 
in question occurred. The policy provided coverage of liability incurred 
because of bodily injury or property damage that occurred “during the policy 
period,” regardless of when the tortious conduct that caused injury or damage 
had occurred. This criterion would later be termed the “trigger” of coverage.70 
 Bodily injury or property damage could occur “during the policy 
period,” yet remain latent for years to come. In such a case, bodily injury or 
property damage would trigger coverage under a CGL insurance policy issued 
years, perhaps decades, before the filing of a suit alleging that the policyholder 
was liable for damages incurred because of that injury or damage. A 
policyholder sued in tort in 1980, for example, could be covered against that 
liability under a policy issued in 1955, if that is when the injury or damage in 
question had occurred, even if it had not been discovered until 1980.71 
 There is no evidence, however, that from the 1940s until the late 
1970s, insurers gave serious consideration to this possibility, or to its 
implications. That is why they waited so long to revise their policies, and why 
their failure to do so contributed to the rise of coverage claims against them 
in the decades to come. Although no one has ever explained this failure, I 
 
67 See generally Abraham, Mega-Coverage Litigation, supra note 5 (explaining that mass tort 
toxic liability emerged within a short window of time and that the body of doctrine could not 
develop quickly enough to meet policyholders’ and insurers’ need for a mature body of law). 
68 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 435 
(6th ed. 2015) (discussing the structure of pre-1985 insurance policies that predate 
contemporary CGLs but closely resemble modern CGL policies in form and function). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 475. 
71 See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 155–57 (describing the evolution of case 
law recognizing a longer period of limitations). 
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think it occurred for a number of reasons.72 First, during this period, insurers 
would justifiably have expected to be protected by the effects of statutes of 
limitations on the right to bring suit alleging liability for long-latent injury or 
damage. Because the applicable period of limitations typically began to run 
on the date that a plaintiff’s injury or damage began to occur, even if that 
harm had not yet been discovered, long-latency claims would ordinarily fall 
outside the period statutorily permitted for bringing suit. Only as judicial and 
statutory exceptions to statutes of limitations for undiscovered injury or 
damage were increasingly created in the 1960s would insurers have felt this 
protection to be dissolving.73 Second, prior to 1970, there had been few suits 
alleging any kind of long-tail liability. It probably appeared to insurers that, 
if policyholders were not being held liable for long-tail harm, then their 
liability insurers were not at risk of having coverage responsibility for long-
tail liability, and these insurers did not need to develop insurance policy 
language detailing the effects on coverage of liability for different forms of 
long-latent harm. 
 Finally, from the time the first standard-form CGL insurance policies 
were marketed in 1941, insurers seem to have envisioned that the policy 
would only cover liability for harm caused by abrupt events that resulted in 
immediate or near-immediate injury or damage. This is because CGL policies 
covered liability imposed because of bodily injury or property damage caused 
by “accident.”74 Insurers’ conception was that an accident was an abrupt 
event.75 Although it is logically possible for an abrupt event, such as an 
explosion, to cause harm that would not manifest itself for some time after 
the explosion, that does not appear to have been part of the paradigm 
“accident” insurers had in mind. Most abrupt events cause injury or disease 
immediately and are known to have done so immediately, or at least within a 
short period of time. Few such events would be expected to cause injury or 
illness during the policy period – and therefore to trigger current coverage – 
 
72 There is some evidence in the drafting history from the 1960s that some consideration was 
given to the problem that might arise if multiple policies covered a liability because it involved 
harm that occurred over a period of years, but the drafters apparently decided not to address the 
issue. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: LIAB. INS. § 41 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2019) (recognizing 
that the record seems to support the concept of stacking; that is, “multiple per-occurrence policy 
limits are available in the event of harm that takes place over multiple years”). 
73 See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1204–05 
(1950) (recommending the adoption of discovery exceptions but recognizing that they did 
not exist in most instances); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 
(4th ed. 1971) (indicating that most jurisdictions had adopted the discovery rule). 
74 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 436. 
75 For examples of courts finding that non-abrupt or imminent events were accidents, see 
cases cited in Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the 
Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 623 nn. 51–
52 (1990). 




without manifesting themselves at virtually the same time. Insurers therefore 
seem not to have envisioned the possibility that their policies could cover 
liability for bodily injury or property damage that occurred during the policy 
period, but was not actually discovered until many years later. 
 For all three reasons, as time went on, the insurance policy language 
introduced in 1941 would turn out to be incomplete and underdeveloped in ways 
that eventually would produce disputed claims and considerable litigation. 
 
1. The shift to occurrence-based coverage  
 
 In the 1950s a new species of tort suit started to test insurers’ 
conception, just described, of what their CGL insurance policies did and did 
not cover. Some policyholders began to make claims for coverage of liability 
for harm that was not caused by an abrupt event, but by continuous or long-
term exposure to hazardous conditions. For the reasons I have just indicated, 
CGL insurers took the position that the harm resulting from slow or 
continuously occurring exposure to a hazardous substance or condition was 
not caused by “accident,” because it did not occur abruptly. Therefore, they 
contended, their policies did not cover liability for that kind of harm.  
 The few cases that ruled on the issue produced a division of 
authority.76 But the possibility that their policies would cover liability for 
continuous or long-term exposure to hazardous conditions had begun to occur 
to CGL insurers. Further, it seems likely that at least some of these insurers 
began to contemplate the corresponding possibility that it would be a policy 
issued years or decades earlier that provided this coverage, because the 
trigger of coverage under their policies was bodily injury or property damage 
during the policy period. Although this kind of liability was not yet being 
referred to as “long-tail” liability, the possibility that CGL insurers had in the 
past issued policies that already covered some of these liabilities was about 
to be brought into sharp relief. 
 The question whether accident-based policies did cover what would 
later be called long-tail liability, however, was never definitively answered. 
In my experience, the reason is that, in order to increase their share of the 
U.S. CGL insurance market, London-based insurers (led by Lloyd’s) began 
to offer an “occurrence” endorsement (effectively, a supplement) to U.S. 
policyholders that rendered the issue moot. The endorsement added coverage 
of liability caused not only by accident, but also by an “occurrence,” and 
defined that term as an “accident, including injurious exposure to 
 
76 See, e.g., Beryllium Corp. v. Amer. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 223 F.2d 71, 74 (3d Cir. 1955) 
(holding that the term “accident” was ambiguous and construing the policy in favor of 
coverage); Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 104 N.E.2d 
250, 254–56 (Ill. 1952) (same). 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [March 2021 
 
   
 
370 
conditions.”77 It is difficult to see this addition to coverage as anything other 
than a recognition that the policy was to cover liability for harm caused by 
pollution and other similar, slowly-occurring processes. Whether the insurers 
recognized that some such processes would cause harm during the policy 
period that was not discovered until much later is not clear. Regardless, as we 
will see later, although the Lloyd’s shift to occurrence-based coverage 
probably did increase its share of the U.S. market for CGL insurance, 
eventually the long-tail chickens would come home to roost: by the 1990s, 
Lloyd’s faced financial disaster and had to restructure itself precisely because 
of the extent of liability it faced under the occurrence policies it had sold to 
U.S. policyholders in the previous decades.78 
CGL insurers in the United States, in order to compete with Lloyd’s, 
then exposed themselves to the same vulnerability. To meet the challenge 
posed by the London policies’ extension of coverage, in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, U.S. insurers began to issue policies containing similar 
occurrence-based coverage, through amendments that provided coverage in 
an “endorsement” added to the policy.79 In 1966, when the U.S. standard-
form CGL policy underwent its next major revision, the new policy form 
recognized this development, by shifting from accident-based to occurrence-
based coverage in the body of the policy itself rather than by endorsement.80 
 In contrast to harm caused by abruptly occurring “accidents,” 
continuous, long-term exposure to harmful conditions is much more likely to 
cause bodily injury or property damage that does not manifest itself for a 
considerable period of time. This is because such exposure is more likely to 
cause insidious disease than are abrupt events, which tend to be violent and 
therefore to cause easily recognized injury. Thus, whether the change in 
policy language merely clarified what had already been the case, or actually 
added coverage that the CGL policy had not provided to that point, for 
policies issued thereafter this issue became moot. As of 1966, the standard 
CGL policy, which already contained the potential to cover long-tail liability, 
now did so in clear terms. Yet this was the very point at which environmental 
consciousness, and the potential for increased environmental liability, placed 
insurers at greater risk. 
 
2. Insurers get cold feet: the partial pollution exclusion 
 
 CGL insurers’ timing in ensuring that their policies covered liability 
for harm caused by continuous, hazardous exposure could not have been 
 
77 THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 157. 
78 See infra discussion accompanying notes 199–203. 
79 THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 157. 
80 Id. 




worse. The 1966 occurrence-based CGL policy was promulgated at what 
turned out to be a pivotal point in the history of environmental law. The half-
dozen years from late 1960s to the early 1970s saw important social and legal 
change in this field. The Torrey Canyon shipwreck polluted miles of the 
French and English coastlines in 1967, with worldwide publicity.81 A major 
oil spill off the coast of California in 1969 polluted the ocean and the beaches 
near Santa Barbara.82 On June 22, 1969, pollutants on the surface of the 
Cuyahoga River in Cleveland caught fire.83 The first “Earth Day” was held 
in April 1970.84 In the wake of and in response to these events, the U.S. 
Congress enacted a series of measures that brought federal environmental 
regulation into the modern era, such as the National Environmental Policy 
Act in 1969;85 the Clean Air Act in 1970;86 and the Clean Water Act in 
1972.87 Environmental consciousness and the prospect of increased 
environmental liability were on the rise.  
  All this of course happened just a few years after adoption of the new 
occurrence-based CGL insurance policy, which much more clearly covered 
liability for pollution, including long-tail harm caused by pollution, than the 
accident-based policy that it replaced. Just a few years after promulgating the 
new policy form, insurers began to recognize the rising potential for their 
policyholders to incur liability for pollution. As a result, they got cold feet. 
Beginning by endorsement (around 1970) and then by revision in the body of 
the standard-form CGL insurance policy in 1973, insurers added what came 
to be called a “qualified” pollution exclusion.88  
 What made the pollution exclusion “qualified” was that it was a 
partial exclusion only. This was accomplished by excluding coverage of 
liability for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge of 
pollutants but making an exception for discharges that were “sudden and 
 
81 Bethan Bell & Mario Cacciottolo, Torrey Canyon Oil Spill: The Day the Sea Turned Black, 
BBC NEWS, (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-39223308 [https:// 
perma.cc/BZM2-WWZU]. 
82 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the party 
responsible for the 1969 spill could be liable to commercial fishermen if their profits were 
reduced by harm to the area fish). 
83 Julie Grant, How a Burning River Helped Create the Clean Water Act, ALLEGHENY FRONT 
(April 21, 2017), https://www.alleghenyfront.org/how-a-burning-river-helped-create-the-
clean-water-act/ [https://perma.cc/Y3RD-7FXZ]. 
84EPA History: Earth Day, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/history/epa-
history-earth-day [https://perma.cc/YRA5-TJQZ]. 
85 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). 
86 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1676. 
87 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816.  
88 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW 145–63 (1991) 
(explaining the origins and evolution of the pollution exclusion); THE LIABILITY CENTURY, 
supra note 1, at 160 (same); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 79–81 (Ill. 1997) 
(providing the history of the pollution exclusion). 
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accidental.”89 It is likely that, from the insurers’ standpoint, this change 
reinstated, for pollution liability, the requirement that harm be caused by an 
abrupt event. Since much, perhaps most, pollution takes place over the long 
term, this could have been seen as a quiet, but substantial, reduction in the 
scope of this expanded coverage. But the insurers did not portray it that way 
at the time. On the contrary, they downplayed the significance of the new 
exclusion in a manner that approached misrepresentation.90 
 For much of the 1970s, what the pollution exclusion actually 
accomplished remained uncertain. Most of the legal action on the pollution 
front until the late 1970s involved the legislation (and subsequent 
administrative environmental regulation) described above, not tort liability 
for pollution damage or for the costs of pollution remediation. Consequently, 
there also was little litigation relating to insurance of liability for pollution 
during that period, and therefore little occasion for the courts to interpret the 
meaning and scope of the pollution exclusion.  
 But the issue was a time bomb, and the bomb eventually exploded. In 
1982, a New Jersey appellate court, affirming a 1979 trial court decision that 
had garnered considerable attention, held that the term “sudden” in the 
“sudden and accidental” exception to the pollution exclusion in a CGL policy 
was ambiguous.91 That term, the court ruled, could mean either abrupt or 
unexpected. Since the provision was drafted by insurers, the court invoked 
the doctrine contra proferentem and interpreted the exception to the exclusion 
against the drafter and in favor of coverage.92 This meant that, for courts that 
would adopt the same approach, the pollution exclusion did not preclude 
coverage of liability for harm caused by gradual, unexpected, and accidental 
pollution—exactly the kind of pollution that was most frequently the subject 
of massive amounts of liability under CERCLA.  
Within a few years, that would turn out to be the kind of pollution that 
resulted in potential liability, and subsequent insurance coverage claims, 
associated with thousands of hazardous waste deposit sites. As with the other 
common law issues already discussed, the meaning of the pollution exclusion 
was a question of state contract that would take several decades for the courts 
 
89 ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 146; Am. States Ins. Co., 687 N.E.2d at 81.  
90 Through their drafting organization, the Insurance Services Office (ISO), the insurers 
sought approval from state insurance commissioners to incorporate the exclusion in CGL 
policies. A letter that often accompanied requests for approval typically indicated that 
“[c]overage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases under present policies 
. . . . The above exclusion clarifies this situation.” ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 156 (quoting 
Insurance Rating Board, Submission to Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia, May 18, 
1970); see also Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 855 (N.J. 
1993) (discussing the legal significance of the representations contained in the letter). 
91 Jackson Twp. Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990, 995 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). 
92 Id. 




in various states to resolve. In the meantime, high stakes litigation over 
insurance coverage proceeded. 
 
B. Claims for Coverage of Mass Tort Liability 
 
 Although pollution liability and the insurance issues that would 
accompany it did not materialize in much litigation until the 1980s, the mass 
tort cases filed in the 1970s spawned highly significant insurance litigation 
late in the decade. Asbestos bodily injury cases are a prime, but no means 
exclusive, example. The occurrence-based policies that many corporate 
policyholders had purchased beginning in the late 1950s were highly 
vulnerable to claims for coverage of liability for bodily injury and property 
damage caused by asbestos. And the prior accident policies, though perhaps 
not quite so clearly vulnerable, were targets as well.   
 The typical plaintiff in an asbestos tort action had been exposed to 
asbestos for a number of years. A typical policyholder was the defendant in 
suits brought by thousands of individuals. The defendants in these cases 
turned to their CGL insurers for coverage of their liabilities. Medical 
testimony in these cases often showed that not only did breathing air 
containing asbestos fibers cause immediate lung damage, but also that, even 
after an individual ceased breathing asbestos fibers in the air, the continued 
presence of the fibers in the lungs aggravated already-existing injury.93 
Policyholders therefore argued that all the policies in force during the period 
running from first exposure to manifestation of a plaintiff’s asbestos-related 
lung disease were triggered.94  
 These corporate policyholders had purchased their CGL coverage in 
layers, with a single insurer issuing a primary policy and other insurers 
supplying successive layers of excess liability insurance. A policyholder 
might therefore have had CGL insurance policies issued by dozens, or even 
hundreds, of insurers over a period of decades. A suit for coverage of 
asbestos-related liability would therefore be brought against all of the dozens 
or hundreds of insurers whose policies were “on the risk” during the relevant 
multi-year period. Perhaps the most vivid example of the size and complexity 
of the mass tort insurance coverage litigation came in a consolidated set of 
asbestos insurance coverage cases, in which there were so many parties that 
the trial had to be held in a school auditorium big enough to fit all the lawyers.95 
 The principal legal issues these suits posed were whether these 
policies were triggered, and if so, how coverage responsibility was to be 
 
93 The seminal case on the issue was Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
94 Id. at 1039. 
95 In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases: Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, 
CJC90001072 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. 1989). 
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allocated among triggered policies. But there were other legal issues as well. 
And in many of the mass tort insurance coverage cases, there was also a major 
factual issue: whether the policyholder had “expected or intended” harm to 
result from exposure to asbestos, since there was no coverage under any 
policy that was on the risk when the policyholder expected harm.96 Insurers 
made strenuous efforts to obtain evidence that the policyholder had expected 
harm at some point, and at what point that was. This issue complicated 
coverage cases exponentially, because it often involved extensive document 
discovery, and the location and subsequent depositions of former or retired 
employees who may have been in a position to know the dangers posed by 
the product or substance in question at some point in the distant past.97 
 
C. CERCLA Pours Gasoline on the Fire 
 
 The enactment of CERCLA in 1980 added a host of significant new 
features to the insurance law challenges that the mass tort cases were already 
beginning to pose. Most of the mass tort cases that had by then resulted in 
insurance coverage litigation did not involve conventional environmental 
pollution; most did not involve what could be called pollution at all. A whole 
series of pollution coverage issues were posed by claims for insurance of 
CERCLA liabilities that simply did not arise in claims for coverage of mass 
tort liabilities. 
 It was not only the range of new insurance coverage issues that 
CERCLA liability introduced, however, that made its influence so great. It 
was also the sheer amount of coverage litigation that CERCLA liability 
spawned. At that point there were comparatively few major mass tort cases. 
Although there were dozens of actual and potential defendants in asbestos 
cases, there was only a single defendant or just a few defendants in the other 
mass tort cases. Consequently, there were actually comparatively few 
insurance coverage cases being pursued at that point.  
 In contrast, there were many hundreds and quite possibly thousands 
of entities who were potentially responsible for cleanup under CERCLA. By 
1992, the National Priority List of just the major sites that the EPA had 
 
96 See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1204–05 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (discussing the dimensions of the expected or intended harm issue in a coverage 
policy long-tail setting). 
97 In the case of Johns-Manville, this sort of discovery eventually uncovered an arguably 
smoking-gun letter written in 1935 by the company president to one of the company’s 
attorneys, acknowledging that exposure to asbestos posed risks that it would be better to keep 
the public from knowing (“the less said about asbestos, the better off we are”). PAUL 
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 116–17 (1985) 
(quoting a letter from Sumner Simpson to Vandiver Brown).  




identified listed 1207 such sites.98 The EPA projected an ultimate total of 
4500 NPL sites,99 and had an inventory listing over 34,000 sites,100 many of 
which involved multiple potentially responsible parties.101 All of these parties 
became potential, and often actual, plaintiffs in insurance coverage suits. This 
meant that long-tail liability insurance coverage litigation went from being 
an identifiable and growing feature of insurance law to being a massive and 
widespread phenomenon, with tens, and perhaps hundreds, of billions of 
dollars at stake for the insurance industry. This litigation overshadowed 
everything else going on in insurance law and practice at the time. 
 
D. A Generation of New Insurance Law 
 
Litigation over coverage of long-tail liabilities arising out of mass tort 
and environmental cleanup liability was particularly intense in the 1980s and 
1990s, as courts in different states resolved numerous issues of first 
impression.102 A whole new body of insurance law doctrine emerged. 
Resolution of the legal issues generated by long-tail insurance coverage 
continues to this day; entire treatises are now devoted to it. I discuss the most 
important doctrines and concepts in this Section, identifying and explaining 
first the doctrines that pertain directly to long-tail coverage, and then those 
that arose out of long-tail coverage disputes but have broader application. 
Many, though by no means all, of the decisions and doctrines that I 
discuss below tended to afford policyholders either full or partial coverage of 
their mass tort and CERCLA liabilities, for several reasons. First, in some 
instances the policy language at issue clearly provided coverage. Second, in 
other cases the policy language was ambiguous, and there was no extrinsic 
evidence (such as trade custom, the parties’ course of dealing, representations 
made in negotiations for the purchase of coverage, or industry-wide policy 
drafting history) sufficient to clarify what was intended. Consequently, the 
courts applied the doctrine contra proferentem and construed the ambiguous 
policy language against its drafter (the insurer), in favor of coverage.  
Finally, insurance coverage law was not and is not bifurcated—the 
same rules governing the meaning and application of CGL insurance policies 
 
98 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., RCED-92-138, SUPERFUND: PROBLEMS WITH THE 
COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY OF SITE CLEANUP PLANS 11 (1992). 
99 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE TOTAL COSTS OF CLEANING UP NONFEDERAL SUPERFUND 
SITES x (1994). 
100 ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, CLEANING UP HAZARDOUS WASTE: IS THERE A 
BETTER WAY? 23 (1993). 
101 See, e.g., id. at 87 (describing the Lone Pine landfill site in New Jersey, where there were 
156 potentially responsible parties). 
102 By 1991, there were enough decisions and new doctrines to fill an entire treatise. See 
generally ABRAHAM, supra note 88 . 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [March 2021 
 
   
 
376 
apply both to sophisticated multinational corporations and small businesses 
covered by these policies. For example, a decision denying coverage of 
CERCLA liability to a major corporation such as DuPont or Exxon, on the 
ground that cleanup costs are not “damages” covered by the policy (see 
below), would also apply to a local dry cleaning business covered by a CGL 
insurance policy facing potentially bankrupting liability for cleanup of a 
municipal site where its waste products had been deposited. For all these 
reasons, the overall tendency of the body of new doctrines was coverage-
favoring rather than coverage-denying. 
The following subsections address insurance law doctrines that are 
complex, intricate, and sometimes difficult to follow for those who are not 
already immersed in the field. But that is part of the point. It is worth working 
through the details of these doctrines, both to understand the many ways in 
which they expanded the scope of insurance coverage of long-tail liability 
under policies that insurers had already sold and also to appreciate why it 
took the courts so long to work through the issues that eventually led to 
adoption of these doctrines. Nothing about the insurance litigation of the 
1980s and 1990s was easy for the courts, and that is why the common law 
process of applying past policies to the new forms of liability took so long.  
 
1. Long-tail coverage doctrines 
 
a. Trigger  
 
The starting point in any long-tail insurance claim is the trigger-of-
coverage question. I noted earlier that what activated, or triggered, CGL 
insurance policies was the occurrence of bodily injury or property damage 
“during the policy period.”103 The first question, therefore, was what counts 
as bodily injury or property damage for purposes of determining what 
happened “during the policy period.” The pivotal trigger question was not so 
much when harm first occurred, although that could sometimes pose a difficult 
factual question, sometimes with legal ramifications when harm was, for 
example, sub-cellar. Rather, the most significant issue was whether coverage 
provided in successive years also was triggered when harm that had begun to 
occur during a prior policy year continued to occur in subsequent years. 
There was medical testimony in asbestos bodily injury cases, for 
example, that harm to lungs from exposure to asbestos continued to occur 
even after airborne exposure ceased. This was termed “exposure-in-
 
103 See, e.g., Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1489, 1513 
(S.D.N.Y 1983) (concluding that coverage is only trigged by “exposure or manifestation” 
when those events are in and of themselves “an injury, sickness or disease for which an 
insured may be held liable”); see also THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 155 
(describing the “trigger” of coverage concept, which exposes insurers to long-tail liability). 




residence.” In the earliest prominent case on the trigger issue in this context, 
Keene Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, the D.C. Circuit ruled that 
bodily injury had occurred during every policy year from the year of first 
exposure to the year when lung damage first manifested itself. This was 
termed the “continuous trigger.”104 Other courts in analogous circumstances 
held that, depending on the evidence, a somewhat similar “injury in fact” 
trigger approach could yield the conclusion that multiple policy years had 
been triggered by injury suffered by a single individual over time.105  
In cleanup coverage cases there were analogous rulings based on the 
notion that waste slowly migrating through groundwater caused new harm to 
previously uncontaminated water and that, therefore, there was property 
damage during the policy period in multiple years as a result of contamination 
at a single site.106 As compared to a single-year of coverage being triggered, 
the multi-year-trigger holdings meant that sometimes twenty or thirty times 
as many insurance policies, and insurers, were vulnerable to claims for 
coverage of the policyholder’s liability. And this meant that twenty or thirty 
times more money was at stake for the policyholder and the insurers as a 
group. Obviously, it is worth investing a lot more in a case that may yield an 
insurance recovery of $200 to $600 million than in a case that can yield, at 
most, $10 to $20 million. The complexity and intensity of coverage battles 
therefore escalated accordingly. 
 
 b. Allocation 
 
The fairly routine triggering of multiple policy years in long-tail 
insurance claims was only the first step in the process that produced 
exponential aggravation of mega-coverage litigation. Once the courts held 
that multiple policy years could be triggered, the crucial issue became 
whether and to what extent the coverage provided in each year could be 
stacked together, so that the policyholder had access to all of the triggered 
coverage. This question thus concerned the allocation of coverage 
responsibility among multiple triggered policy years. Since many large 
companies facing long-tail liabilities had been purchasing CGL insurance— 
 
104 See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding 
that “any part of the single injurious process” could trigger coverage). 
105 See Am. Home Prod. Corp., 565 F. Supp. at 1508 (holding that the policy language was 
consistent with the expectation that coverage would include injuries that occurred under 
previous policies). 
106 See, e.g., N. States Power v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994) 
(stating that courts had previously concluded the contamination of groundwater was a 
continuous process resulting in damage); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 
913 P.2d 878, 904 (Cal. 1995) (“We therefore conclude that the continuous injury trigger of 
coverage should be applied to the underlying third party claims of continuous or 
progressively deteriorating damage or injury . . . .”). 
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sometimes hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of it—for decades, whether 
all this coverage was available, or only some of it, could mean as much as 
half a billion dollars to each individual company facing liability, and to its 
liability insurers as a group. 
In theory the policies covering any particular triggered policy year 
would cover only liability for the damages imposed because of the bodily 
injury or property damage that occurred during that year. But for practical 
purposes there usually was no way to apportion such liability or damages. An 
asbestos plaintiff had only one lung disease, not a set of partial diseases or 
injury that had occurred in a particular year. At a hazardous waste site, the 
waste deposited in each year typically had leached out of the site and 
combined. Consequently, ordinarily the damage to a plaintiff or to property 
at a site was indivisible by year.107 
Most courts addressing the allocation issue held in such instances that, 
in order to recover, the policyholder did not have to apportion damage by 
year when the damage was theoretically or practically indivisible. Rather, 
each policy could be held liable for damage that occurred partly during its 
policy year and partly during other years.108 The policyholder was thus 
entitled to call upon all triggered years for coverage. That is, in cases 
involving damage that was not divisible by year, “stacking,” or adding 
together the coverage applying to different triggered years, was permitted.  
But the method under which coverage could be stacked mattered as 
well. There were two general approaches, though each had nuances. The first 
approach held that the policies (primary and excess) that were in force during 
all triggered policy years were subject to what amounted to joint-and-several 
liability for their coverage responsibilities. A policyholder could select a 
triggered year, access the coverage provided by the policies applicable to that 
year until they were exhausted, and, if these did not fully cover a judgment, 
select another year until the amount of the covered judgment was fully 
reimbursed.109 This could easily mean that policies providing $100 million or 
 
107 In re Silicon Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 418 (Minn. 2003) (citing 
ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 120). 
108 See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 475 (describing courts’ adoption of 
multiyear injury-in-fact triggers). 
109See, e.g., State v. Continental Ins. Co., 281 P.3d 1000, 1008 (Cal. 2012) (applying stacking 
to allow the insured immediate access to the purchased insurance); Plastics Eng’g Co. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759 N.W.2d 613, 625 (Wis. 2009) (holding that the insurer was 
responsible up to the policy limit once the policy was triggered); Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ohio 2002) (adopting the stacking 
approach to seek full coverage from an individual policy out of any of the triggered policies); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Ind. 2001) (“[O]nce an occurrence 
takes place, Allstate is obligated to indemnify Dana for all sums related to that occurrence 
up to the policy limits.”); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 
 




more in any given year, over a period of twenty or more triggered years, could 
all be held to have covered a judgment against the policyholder. 
The alternative was pro-rata allocation.110 Under this approach, 
coverage responsibility is pro-rated by year among triggered policy years. If 
a $200 million liability triggered twenty policy years, then each policy year 
would be potentially responsible for its pro-rata share of $10 million. If the 
policyholder had not purchased $10 million or more of coverage during any 
of those years, then it could recover at most the amount of coverage it had 
purchased. The result is that the pro-rata approach can never be more 
advantageous than the joint-and-several approach for a policyholder, and 
often will be less advantageous. 
Complicated as these trigger and allocation issues are, I have vastly 
oversimplified them. They generated many subsidiary issues, such as how to 
handle cases in which some insurers whose policies were triggered had 
settled with the policyholder and some had not;111 how to determine how 
many occurrences had caused harm, when policies provided coverage on a 
per occurrence basis and applied deductibles on the same basis;112 and what  
 
507–08 (Pa. 1993) (using the language of the policies themselves to justify the stacking 
approach). This whole approach is sometimes termed “vertical” allocation. See Viking Pump 
v. TIG Ins. Co., 52 N.E.3d 1144, 1156 (N.Y. 2016) (discussing vertical exhaustion as being 
consistent with stacked allocation). This is because, for any selected policy year, insurers are 
liable in the order in which they provide coverage, from primary, to first-layer excess, and 
so on up the layers of coverage.  
110 See, e.g., Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 303 (Mass. 2009) 
(detailing how the pro-rata approach aims for equity across a time period and often requires 
policyholder participation); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1165–67 (Vt. 2008) 
(utilizing pro-rata allocation of indemnity costs between the parties); Consol. Edison Co. of 
N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 695 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that pro-rata 
allocation was consistent with “the amount of time the policy was in effect in comparison to 
the overall duration of the damage”); Mayor of Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 
1103–04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (holding that the facts allowed for pro-rata allocation, 
which was more consistent with the continuous trigger at issue). 
111 See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. One Beacon Am. Ins. Co., 864 F.3d 130, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(determining that the effect of prior settlement should be considered in allocation); Koppers 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1449–56 (3d Cir. 1996) (evaluating the impact 
of settlement on judgment and determining that the lower court erred by not accounting for 
previous settlements); Dresser Ind. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 106 S.W.3d 767, 
771 (Tex. 2003) (holding that not all prior judgments preclude further litigation). 
112 See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1191 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (“[E]ach installation of NGC’s products constituted a separate occurrence, 
requiring the application of another deductible.”); London Mkt. Ins. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 154, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (considering the implication of aggregating 
deductibles: that some claims could be aggregated); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 765 A.2d 891, 896–909 (Conn. 2001) (summarizing relevant case law relating to 
per occurrence policies and deductibles); Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759 
N.W.2d 613, 623 (Wis. 2009) (concluding that “continued and repeated” exposure 
constituted a single occurrence in this case).  
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to do when some triggered policies were issued by now-insolvent insurers.113 
In addition, a current issue that is still hot after all these years is how 
to treat years when insurance against the liability in question was not 
available. Is the insured to be treated as a self-insurer for these years, or is 
coverage responsibility pro-rated only to years when insurance could have 
been purchased? For example, once the qualified and absolute pollution 
exclusions became standard provisions in CGL policies, arguably insurance 
against cleanup liability was not “available,” at least under the pollution 
exclusion law of some states. If years when these exclusions were 
incorporated into a policy were nonetheless responsible for coverage, then 
the policyholder could be a self-insurer for those years when insurance 
against pollution was unavailable. Tens or hundreds of millions of dollars 
could turn on the answer to this question in each individual case. And the 
answers are still coming in. 
 
c. The qualified and absolute pollution exclusions 
 
Although the pollution exclusions do not apply exclusively to long-
tail liability, these policy provisions have been so centrally involved in long-
tail litigation that I consider them here. I have already indicated that, beginning 
in the late 1970s, the courts split over the meaning of the exception to the 
qualified exclusion for bodily injury or property damage caused by a “sudden 
and accidental” discharge of pollutants.114 Many courts held that the term 
“sudden” had a temporal component and meant “abrupt,”115 but other courts held 
that the term was ambiguous, and that the exclusion therefore did not preclude 
coverage of liability for harm caused by discharges that occurred gradually.116  
 
113 See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing 
a New York rule that requires the insured to bear the pro-rata share of the insolvent insurer’s 
indemnity); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fairbanks Co., 170 F. Supp. 3d 634, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (discussing conflicts between Georgia and New York insurance insolvency laws).  
114 See supra notes 89–91. 
115 See, e.g., Buell Indus. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 791 A.2d 489, 499 (Conn. 2002) 
(defining sudden as occurring “abruptly or within a short amount of time”); Dimmitt 
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 704 (Fla. 1993) (“As 
expressed in the pollution exclusion clause, the word sudden means abrupt and 
unexpected.”); Northville Indus. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 679 N.E.2d 
1044, 1047 (N.Y. 1997) (finding that excluding a temporal element from the definition of 
“sudden” would render the sudden exception redundant). 
116 See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (refusing 
to accept a purely temporal connotation of “sudden”); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (Ga. 1989) (concluding that the ambiguity should be construed in favor 
of the insured to mean “unexpected and unintended”); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218 (Ill. 1992) (resolving ambiguity in favor of the insured, 
especially when the ambiguity is found in an exclusionary clause). 




Such interpretations made it possible for policyholders to secure 
coverage of liability for billions of dollars of CERCLA liability. Along with 
decisions on trigger and allocation, this interpretation led to the 1986 revision 
of the standard-form CGL insurance policy, most prominently to the 
incorporation of an “absolute” pollution exclusion in that policy. 
But there is now a division of authority about the meaning of that 
exclusion. The definition of a “pollutant” in the standard CGL policy is 
extraordinarily broad: “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or 
contaminant . . . .”117 Under this definition, spicy mustard splashed into an 
individual’s eye could be considered a “pollutant.” Given the breadth, and 
arguable overbreadth, of this definition, courts struggle with the appropriate 
scope of the exclusion. Some courts hold that the exclusion must be interpreted 
in light of its purpose, which was and is to preclude coverage of liability for 
harm caused by what they sometimes call “traditional environmental 
pollution,”118 a phrase that itself is not self-defining. Under this interpretation, 
the exclusion does not apply to harm caused by carbon monoxide fumes inside 
a building119 or water that backs up from a sewer system.120 
Other courts, however, interpret the exclusion “as written,” and apply 
it to liability for harm that would not be considered “environmental” in the 
traditional sense, such as ammonia fumes emitted from a blueprint 
machine121 and lead paint in a hospital.122 Thus, nearly fifty years after a 
pollution exclusion was first included in CGL policies, the courts are 
continuing to grapple with the difficulty of distinguishing between covered 
and excluded liability for harm that, in a non-technical sense, many observers 
would conclude was caused by pollution. 
 
2. New, generally applicable doctrines 
 
A number of other issues that could have been raised even before 
long-tail insurance coverage litigation arose, but rarely were raised, have 
experienced significant doctrinal development as a result of long-tail 
insurance litigation. In the Section, I briefly canvas the major doctrines that 
burgeoned and became much more significant as a result of long-tail 
litigation, despite the fact that they then applied across the board. 
 
 
117 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 453. 
118 See e.g., Amer. States Ins. v. Koloms, 687 N.E. 2d 72, 82 (Ill. 1997) (excepting carbon 
monoxide from a broken furnace as not being contemplated by the exclusion clause). 
119 Id. 
120 Minerva Enters. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 851 S.W.2d 403, 405–06 (Ark. 1993). 
121 Deni Assocs. of Fla. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1141 (Fla. 1998).  
122 Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Cowen Constr., Inc., 55 P.3d 1030, 1034–35 (Okla. 2002). 
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a. The meaning of “damages”  
 
CGL policies cover only liability payable “as damages.” Early on in the 
development of long-tail insurance coverage litigation, a hotly-litigated question 
was whether CERCLA liability, especially when created by an administrative 
order or injunction directing a responsible party to undertake cleanup, 
constituted “damages.” Prior to the enactment of CERCLA, only a handful of 
cases had addressed whether the costs of complying with certain forms of 
injunctive relief constituted “damages” under liability insurance policies, each 
holding that these costs were not damages.123 The issue barely existed.  
This then became a key question, because CERCLA liability rarely is 
imposed by virtue of governmentally-financed cleanup and a subsequent 
cost-recovery suit against responsible parties. Rather, whenever a responsible 
party is available and solvent, an administrative or injunctive cleanup order 
is the EPA’s first choice. After some fits and starts applying the traditional 
rule,124 most courts eventually held that both forms of CERCLA liability are 
payable “as damages.”125 If this had not been the case, little of the vast body  
 
123 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955) (reasoning 
that the term “damages . . . has an accepted meaning in law” that does not include the costs 
of complying with an injunctive decree ordering the removal of rocks and the building of a 
bulkhead); Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 292 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1974) (distinguishing injunctive relief from damages on the ground that the latter are 
“remedial rather than preventive” and noting that “[t]he expense of restoring plaintiff’s 
property” in compliance with an injunctive decree  was not remedial); Desrochers v. N.Y. 
Cas. Co., 106 A.2d 196, 198 (N.H. 1954) (observing that if a plaintiff’s injuries are 
“permanent and irrevocable” plaintiff would be entitled to damages that may trigger an 
insurer’s obligation). 
124 See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Armco, 822 F.2d 1348, 1354 (4th Cir. 1987) (following Hanna 
to find that costs of CERCLA compliance are not damages and so are not covered by 
Armco’s insurance policy); Mraz v. Canadian Univ. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1329 (4th Cir. 
1986) (finding that plain language of CERCLA’s relevant provisions indicates that 
“[r]esponse costs [of waste cleanup] are not themselves property damages.”). 
125 See, e.g., A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 620 (Iowa 
1991) (giving damages the meaning “the ordinary reasonable person would believe the term 
to mean” and finding that this meaning encompassed CERCLA response costs); Aetna Cas. 
& Sur. v. Kentucky, 179 S.W.3d 830, 838–39 (Ky. 2005) (agreeing with the “majority of 
state appellate courts” that the “ordinary” meaning of damages encompasses response and 
cleanup costs mandated under CERCLA for the purposes of remedying ongoing injury); 
Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 19 (Me. 1990) (mentioning, but 
declining to follow, courts that found coverage for government-mandated cleanup costs by 
reasoning that ordinary people cannot understand the narrower legal meaning of “damages,” 
which does not include such costs); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 665 
N.W.2d 257, 280–81 (Wis. 2003) (rejecting a “too-confining, overly technical definition of 
‘damages’” and arguing that a broader definition which includes CERCLA response costs 
does not render the term “damages” mere surplusage because CGL policies do not cover the 
costs of complying with general regulations or prospective conduct). 




of insurance law doctrine that subsequently emerged would have been 
necessary, because insurers would have been able to avoid covering most 
CERCLA liabilities. 
 
b. The meaning of “expected”  
 
A principal exclusion in CGL and other liability insurance policies 
precludes coverage of liability for harm that is “expected or intended from 
the standpoint of the insured.” Some insurers argued (based partly on the 
phrase “from the standpoint of the insured”) that the test for what was 
expected was fully or semi-objective, and that the exclusion applied if a party 
in the insured’s position should have expected harm.126 In its most extreme 
version, this argument would have inserted a negligence exclusion into 
insurance policies designed mainly to cover liability for negligence. Most 
courts therefore rejected this argument, confirming that the test is 
subjective.127 There remained, however, questions regarding whose 
expectation counted, and what had to be expected, under the exclusion. For 
example, was bodily injury or property damage excluded when a single low-
level employee expected it, or was some level of management complicity 
required? Similarly, was coverage of liability for mesothelioma precluded if 
the maker of insulation containing asbestos expected some minor lung damage 
to result from exposure to airborne asbestos, but had no reason to expect that it 
would result in lung cancer? Was coverage of liability for groundwater cleanup 
precluded if damage to topsoil from the deposit of waste was expected, but no 
harm to groundwater was envisioned? To this day, the case law on these sub-
issue “expected or intended” questions is sparse.128 We can expect that it will 
be still more decades before definitive doctrines govern this issue. 
 
c. The scope of the owned-property exclusion  
 
CGL policies have long excluded coverage of liability for harm to 
property owned, rented, or occupied by the insured. The idea behind the 
exclusion is that the risk that one’s property will be damaged is the province 
 
126 See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1205 (“. . . 
[T]he Insurers contended that coverage of the underlying asbestos-related bodily injury 
claims should be precluded because NGC ‘expected’ or “intended” the injuries within the 
meaning of the ‘occurrence’ definition.”). 
127 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 500. 
128 See, e.g., Am. Fam. Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 611–12 (Minn. 2001) (holding 
that once some harm is expected or intended, the type of harm that occurs is irrelevant to 
application of the exclusion); Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kment, 658 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 2003) 
(same); SL Indus. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1274–75 (N.J. 1992) (holding 
that a different type of harm than was expected is not excluded); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n 
v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (same). 
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of first-party property insurance, not liability insurance.129 Many CERCLA 
cleanups took place on property owned by the insured. Frequently, however, 
pollutants escaped beyond the boundaries of property owned by the insured 
and contaminated non-owned property. Because the source of contamination 
is on the insured’s property, sometimes cleanup of the owned property is 
necessary to remedy or prevent further contamination of non-owned property. 
The question is whether and to what extent the exclusion applies to cleanup 
of owned property. 
A few of the first cases to apply the owned-property exclusion when 
there was no offsite damage held that the cost of cleanup of owned property 
was not excluded as long as harm to non-owned property was “imminent.”130 
These early decisions proved to be outliers, however, as most courts held that 
the exclusion applied unless there had already been actual damage to non-
owned property.131 Further, when that was the case, there would have to be 
apportionment of the cost of cleanup of owned property, as between costs 
benefiting owned property (to which the exclusion applied) and costs benefitting 
non-owned property (to which the exclusion did not apply).132 This doctrine now 
applies generally; if damage to owned property must be repaired in order to 
prevent further damage to non-owned property, then the entire cost of repair is 
not automatically excluded by the owned-property exclusion.133 
But it is mostly in connection with environmental cleanup that the 
owned-property exclusion applies. The rub in this setting turned out to be 
that, as I noted earlier, a major portion of CERCLA cleanup costs is 
attributable to the cost of decontaminating underground aquifers, or 
 
129 See ABRAHAM, supra note 88, at 163 (“The ‘owned-property’ exclusion[’s] . . . general 
function is to prevent the insured from using a liability insurance policy as if it provided 
property insurance.”). 
130 See id. (noting that the owned-property exclusion functions whether the contamination 
took place on insured’s property or others’ property); Savoy Med. Supply Co. v. F & H Mfg. 
Corp. 776 F. Supp. 703, 706–09 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding damage was “outside the confines 
of the owned property exclusion” even without evidence that contaminants spread to adjacent 
lands or groundwater because the damage posed a threat to the public). 
131 See, e.g., Hakim v. Mass. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 675 N.E.2d 1161, 1165–66 (Mass. 
1997) (holding that insurer was not liable for costs of cleaning insured’s property because 
the “sole purpose” of such cleanup was to remediate insured’s property); State v. Signo 
Trading Int’l, 612 A.2d 932, 939 (N.J. 1992) (emphasizing “plain language” of CGL policy 
that excluded the cost of future damage from coverage and lack of evidence of injury to third-
party property). 
132 See generally Kirby T. Griffis, Note, Apportionment of Environmental Cleanup Costs 
Under the Owned-Property Exclusion in CGL Insurance Policies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1994) 
(comparing methods of apportioning costs for environmental cleanup under the owned-
property exclusion and arguing that clear apportionment rules would have significant benefits). 
133 See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 685 A.2d 858, 870 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (finding 
that owned-property exclusion does not preclude coverage of cost of altering a glass 
enclosure in a condominium unit that caused water damage to neighboring property). 




“groundwater.”134 By clever advocacy, policyholder lawyers demonstrated 
that, under the law of some states, groundwater is not “owned,” or not 
“owned” exclusively, by the owner of the land under which the groundwater 
is located. Rather, the waters of these states are held in trust by the state for 
the people. Therefore, courts held, the owned-property exclusion did not 
apply at all to the costs of decontaminating groundwater under the insured’s 
property.135 This has been an enormous financial coup for policyholders in 
these states, and a blow to their insurers. It has enabled policyholders’ access 
to coverage for the cost of cleaning up what everyone had always thought 
was their own property. 
 
d. The duty to defend a “suit” 
 
 CGL insurance policies embody both a duty to indemnify and a duty 
to defend a “suit” that alleges liability falling within the terms of coverage. 
Insureds receiving communications from the EPA regarding potential 
CERCLA liabilities typically sought defense under their insurance policies, on 
the ground that an EPA “PRP Letter” was the functional equivalent of a “suit.” 
The courts split on the issue, and this division of authority seems stable.136 
 
 
134 See Ferris & Rees, supra note 44, at 833 (citing estimates that it could take 100 to 1000 
years to completely decontaminate an aquifer by the pump and treat method). 
135 See, e.g., United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 738 N.W.2d 578, 585 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) 
(noting that insurers conceded that groundwater was not insured’s property); Schnitzer Inc. 
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 137 P.3d 1282, 1284 (Or. 2006) (rejecting 
insured’s argument that insurer was obligated to indemnify insured for future groundwater 
decontamination but accepting that the owned-property exclusion does not encompass 
groundwater); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 167, 193 (La. Ct. App. 
2003) (agreeing with earlier Louisiana decision that treated groundwater as a “fugitive 
subsurface mineral” not owned by insured). 
136 Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. Co. of Wausau, 728 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the insured’s PRP letter from the EPA was “a suit for arguably-covered 
damages” as contemplated under the pertinent policies, which triggered their duty to defend); 
SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the 
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency’s Request for Information letter constituted a “suit”); 
A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 629 (Iowa 1991) (holding 
that the EPA’s PRP letter and subsequent actions constituted a “suit” under a CGL policy); 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1517 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
PRP letter issued by the EPA constitutes a "suit" because an “ordinary person” would 
perceive such a letter as notice of the “effective commencement of a ‘suit’ necessitating a 
legal defense.”); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Idaho 1986) (“The 
duty to defend arises upon the filing of a complaint whose allegations, in whole or in part, 
read broadly, reveal a potential for liability that would be covered by the insured's policy.”); 
Simon Wrecking Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 2d 624, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding 
that PRP letters constitute claims, rather than suits).  
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* * * 
 
To sum up, litigation over the issues that long-tail liability generated 
was protracted, complex, and expensive. Today, whether an issue arises only 
in connection with long-tail coverage or more generally, discussion of these 
issues, and the dozens of legal doctrines that pertain to them, now fill treatises 
and casebooks. All of these legal issues occupy insurance coverage lawyers 
in the kinds of coverage disputes that simply did not exist fifty years ago. In 
that space of time, long-tail liability produced a revolution in insurance law. 
 
III. THE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHANGES IN TORT  
AND INSURANCE LAW DOCTRINE 
 
 Long-tail liability not only had separate, far-reaching impacts on the 
common law of tort and the common law of liability insurance. In addition, the 
interaction between these two domains as a result of long-tail liability, and the 
consequences of this interaction, influenced the two fields in a number of other 
fundamental ways. It is no exaggeration to say that the combined effect of these 
developments transformed the world of tort law and insurance. 
The individual developments discussed below involved the 
occurrence of a “crisis” in tort and liability insurance in the mid-1980s; an 
antitrust suit brought by nineteen states against the property/casualty insurance 
industry; the end of the century-long era of tort liability expansion; the entry of 
legislatures into the tort liability arena for the first time; the rise of a new form 
of insurance coverage as alternative to the CGL occurrence policy; the most 
radical restructuring of Lloyd’s of London in centuries; the advent of insurance 
policies, issued in Bermuda to U.S. corporations, that require arbitration of 
insurance coverage disputes; and the increased tendency of major corporations 
to self-insure non-catastrophic levels of liability instead of relying on liability 
insurance. Each of these developments not only figured in the history of tort 
and insurance, but influenced their contemporary character. 
 
A. The Liability Insurance “Crisis” 
  
As the long-tail tort and liability insurance litigation that began in the 
late 1970s continued, a shock hit the insurance markets. In late 1985 and 
1986, premiums for CGL and medical malpractice insurance suddenly 
skyrocketed, sometimes doubling or tripling at the time of renewal. Further, 
some policyholders in some states, mainly municipalities and obstetricians, 




could not get coverage at any reasonable price.137 The March 24, 1986 cover 
of Time Magazine carried the headline, “Sorry, America, Your Insurance Has 
Been Canceled.”138 
 Consumer groups blamed the crisis on an alleged insurance industry 
conspiracy to raise premiums, and called for repeal of the special protection 
that enabled intra-industry cooperation: the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s139 
longstanding exemption of the insurance industry from the reach of the U.S. 
antitrust laws.140 In contrast, the insurance industry—allied with business and 
medical interests—and the U.S. Justice Department blamed the crisis on the 
expansions of tort and environmental liability, as well as the courts’ 
interpretation of CGL insurance policies which have been chronicled above. 
These interests descended on legislatures to demand tort reform.141 
 In actuality, the causes of the crisis were more complicated than either 
side recognized. Property-casualty insurance is subject to periodic cycles in 
which premiums are comparatively flat for a time and then rise steeply. The 
crisis occurred during one of these points in the cycle; it was simply more 
severe than past cycles had been. Explanations for this severity probably lie 
partly in the rise of mass tort and environmental cleanup liability, but also in 
the fact that insurers anticipated losing important advantages under the Tax 
 
137 See Richard N. Clarke, Frederick Warren-Boulton, David D. Smith & Marilyn J. Simon, 
Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 
367 (1988) (listing large property-casualty insurance rate increases for various types of 
policyholders, including fifty to one hundred percent increases for obstetricians); THE 
LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 164 (noting that, during the insurance crisis, “[f]or 
some policyholders for a limited time, CGL coverage was not available at any price”). 
138 TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 24, 1986), http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,1986 
0324,00.html [https://perma.cc/D9NY-3LJZ]. 
139 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. 
140 See, e.g., NAT’L INS. CONSUMER ORG., THE LIABILITY CRISIS IN INSURANCE 6–7 (1986) 
(proposing changes to the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s exemption for the insurance industry in 
order to prevent insurers from fixing prices); Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: 
How the McCarran-Ferguson Act Raises Prices and Profits in the Property-Casualty 
Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 402–07, 414 (1988) (arguing that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act was a “major cause” of the insurance industry’s recurring crises, in part 
because of its authors’ failure to account for evidence of collusive conduct among insurers).  
141 See, e.g., INS. INFO. INST., THE LAWSUIT CRISIS 4 (1986) (attributing the insurance crisis 
to the costs of increased liability); THE BUS. ROUNDTABLE, TORT LAW REFORM POLICY 
STATEMENT 5, 118–24 (1986) (supporting bill allowing for individual treble damage liability 
in antitrust suits on the ground that the bill would prevent antitrust plaintiffs from making 
use of “whipsawing” settlement techniques); Clarke et al., supra note 137, at 377 (discussing 
common insurers’ argument that changes in tort law which expanded damages and liability 
for policyholders made liability insurance scarce and more costly); American International 
Group, “There’s a Price to be Paid for Excessive Liability Awards in Our Courts,” WASH. 
POST, Dec. 17, 1985 at A16 (promising to “continue to speak out for corrective legislation” 
to address “enormous” damage awards that “will be paid by all of us who participate in the 
economic system.”). 
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Reform Act of 1986, and accordingly had made accounting adjustments that 
resulted in short-term restrictions of available capital—the raw material of 
insurance—that automatically produced premium increases.142  
 Those explanations, however, took some time to emerge, and in any 
event probably would have been too complex to influence the dramatic 
headlines and heated controversy over what or whom to blame for the crisis. 
There were subsequent studies and reports analyzing the crisis at both the 
federal and state levels, and proposals for insurance and tort law reform by 
both government and interest groups.143 Nor were all the bedfellows entirely 
comfortable with each other. Many businesses had made claims against or 
had been litigating with their insurers over toxic tort, products, and cleanup 
liability coverage in the years leading up to the crisis, and then found that 
they faced steep premium increases. Although they supported tort reform, 
these policyholders had no particular trust in their insurers, especially when 
they found, as we will see next, that the industry was also in the process of 
cutting back on the coverage it was willing to provide them. Although 
eventually the crisis subsided, it has had a lasting impact on those who lived 
through it. Insurers felt wrongly accused of conspiracy, and policyholders felt 
that their long-time insurers had deserted them. They have dealt with each 
other much more clearly at arms-length ever since.144 
 
B. Revision of the CGL Insurance Policy and the States’ Antitrust Suit 
  
By the late 1970s, largely in reaction to the advent of claims for 
coverage of the new long-tail liabilities, the Insurance Services Office 
(“ISO”)—the policy-drafting and loss-data collecting arm of the property-
casualty insurance industry—began the process of revising the standard-form 
CGL insurance policy.145 By 1983 and 1984, some insurers were pressing 
ISO to do away with coverage of long-tail liability altogether, substituting a 
 
142 For analytical studies of the causes of the crisis, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense 
of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO STATE L.J. 399 (1987); George L. Priest, The 
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987); Symposium, 
Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988); Ralph A. Winter, The 
Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE. J. ON REG. 455 
(1988); Kyle D. Logue, Toward a Tax-Based Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 
82 VA. L. REV. 895 (1996). 
143 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP AN UPDATE ON THE 
LIABILITY CRISIS (1987); GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY COMM’N ON LIAB. INS., STATE OF N.Y., 
INSURING OUR FUTURE (1986); INS. SERVS. OFF., INSURER PROFITABILITY: THE FACTS (1986). 
144 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 85, 102–03 (2001). 
145 THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 163. 




new form of liability insurance—claims-made coverage—for the form of 
CGL coverage they had been providing for the past 40 years.146  
 By this point, insurers had seen that many courts were interpreting 
CGL insurance policies in ways that, in the insurers’ view, unduly favored 
coverage of long-tail liabilities. Decisions that permitted stacking coverage 
provided during multiple years, and holding that the term “sudden” in the 
exception to the pollution exclusion did not automatically have a temporal 
component, were prime examples.147 In addition, the willingness of the courts 
to hold that policy language that insurers had considered clear was in fact 
ambiguous, and then to interpret the ambiguous language against the drafter 
and in favor of coverage, undermined insurers’ confidence that standard 
occurrence-based CGL insurance policies would be interpreted as written.148 
 Some insurers therefore wanted to circumvent these problems by 
fashioning a new form of coverage. “Claims-made” coverage effectively 
eliminates the difficulty of setting premiums for coverage of long-tail 
liability, by covering many fewer long-tail liabilities. The trigger of coverage 
under a claims-made policy is a claim made (usually a lawsuit) against the 
policyholder during the policy period, regardless of how long ago the bodily 
injury or property damage alleged in the claim occurred.149 A claims-made 
insurer whose policyholder begins to experience long-tail liability claims 
during the policy year can anticipate the severity of claims that will continue 
to be made in subsequent policy years, and either raise premiums accordingly 
or exclude coverage of that particular type of suit altogether. An occurrence 
insurer cannot do that because its past policies already cover such liability. In 
contrast to occurrence coverage, then, claims-made policies shift part of the 
risk of an uncertain liability-and-coverage future to the policyholder, who 
then bears more of the risk of long-tail liability than before. 
 The insurers pressing ISO to revise the CGL policy in the mid-1980s 
also favored completely eliminating pollution liability insurance from the 
CGL policy by substituting an “absolute” pollution exclusion for the 
“qualified” pollution exclusion that had been in the policy since 1973.150 
Reinsurers, including those in Lloyd’s of London, seem to have favored 
revision, and at the urging of some insurers, indicated to ISO that they would 
 
146 Id.  
147 See supra text accompanying note 114–16.  
148 See 1 REPORTERS’ STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 55, 92 
(AM. L. INST. 1991) (“[J]udicial interpretations of policy language that some insurers…had 
regarded as fixed, clear, and limiting, have expanded the scope of coverage against both 
conventional and newer forms of liability.”). 
149 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 534–35. 
150 Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 74–75 (Ill. 1997). 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [March 2021 
 
   
 
390 
decline to reinsure CGL insurance policies that were not amended to restrict 
or eliminate long-tail coverage.151 
 As a practical matter, the insurers pressing ISO to revise the standard-
form CGL policy could not have revised their own policies to conform to 
their preferences and then sold these revised policies. At that point in its 
history, ISO collected industry-wide claim and loss data and promulgated 
advisory premium rates for its existing policies, and recommended rates for 
new policies. It would have been economically risky for an individual insurer 
to venture to price a new policy on its own. More importantly, however, a 
policy with more restrictive coverage than the standard form CGL policy then 
in force would have been received unfavorably in the market. Policyholders 
would not have bought it in sufficient numbers when a more attractive policy 
was available, even if it carried a lower price.152 Rather, in order to obtain a 
revised, more restrictive CGL policy that the market would have to accept 
because all insurers offered it alone, the insurers pressed ISO to amend that 
policy and discontinue the policy it would replace. 
 In the end, ISO did not eliminate the occurrence policy, but it did 
promulgate a standard-form claims-made CGL policy that insurers could use 
if they preferred to do so. The only recommendation that ISO squarely adopted 
was to insert an absolute pollution exclusion into ISO’s revised 1986 standard-
form policy.153 That eliminated a considerable portion of the coverage of long-
tail liability that CGL policies have provided ever since. But because of the 
trigger of coverage under pre-1986 policies, long-tail pollution-coverage issues 
under those policies continue to arise and be litigated.154 
 Just as the controversy over the crisis of 1985–86 was dying down 
and the insurance market was stabilizing, however, another striking 
development occurred. In 1988, nineteen states brought suit against ISO, the 
CGL insurers that had importuned ISO to eliminate long-tail coverage from 
the CGL policy, and a number of reinsurance entities,155 alleging that these 
 
151 Other demands were that the claims-made policy be subject to a retroactive date and that 
the costs of defense erode policy limits. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 
764, 771 (1993) (“[T]he defendants wanted the ‘claims-made’ policy to have a ‘retroactive 
date’ provision, which would further restrict coverage to claims based on incidents that 
occurred after a certain date.”). 
152 The dynamics of this process are discussed in ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 
36–38 and 167–68. 
153 THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 164. 
154 See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 864 F.3d 130, 138, 154 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(remanding for further proceedings a case involving claims for coverage of asbestos 
liabilities under CGL policies issued from the 1950s through 1970).  
155 In re Ins. Antitrust Litig. 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d and remanded, 938 
F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see also Lawrence M. Fisher, States and Industry Battling 
 




defendants’ threats and conduct in the process of revising the CGL policy 
amounted to a conspiracy in violation of the one feature of the Sherman Act 
from which the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not exempt them, the 
prohibitions against boycott and agreements to boycott.156 
 Eventually, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Supreme 
Court of the United States ruled that the alleged core activities of the defendants 
in attempting to have ISO modify its standard-form CGL policy were not 
boycotts.157 The case was remanded and settled because, for practical purposes, 
the plaintiffs had lost.158 The ruling confirmed that the process by which ISO 
prepared standard-form policies, including CGL policies, was not unlawful. 
 In doctrinal terms, therefore, the case is a landmark clarification of 
the meaning of the term “boycott” as applied to the insurance policy drafting 
process, though only that. But in practical terms the decision left the 
insurance industry free to act collectively in the preparation of standard-form 
policies. It enabled the industry to continue to present a unified front in 
dealing with the corporations that buy CGL insurance. It left the new worlds 
of tort and insurance law in place. 
 There was another important non-doctrinal subtext in the case, 
moreover, that never found its way into a judicial opinion at any of the three 
levels where it was adjudicated. The case was brought in the aftermath of the 
liability insurance crisis, soon after introduction of the revised CGL insurance 
policy that cut back on a significant component of long-tail coverage through 
the new, absolute pollution exclusion. The implication of the suit, at least for 
some observers, was that the behind-the-scenes maneuvering and threats that 
were alleged in Hartford Fire to have led to revision of the CGL policy also 
had led to the liability insurance crisis itself.159 The implication of the suit, 
that is, was that the steep increases in premiums and the coverage shortages 
that produced the crisis were a product of the same kind of conspiratorial 
conduct that had led to revisions of the CGL insurance policy that eliminated 
coverage of liability for pollution. The suit thus reinforced the climate of 
distrust that was already present in the relationship between the corporate 
policyholders and their insurers. 
 
on Liability Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1988, at A1 (“The suits contend that four major 
insurance companies conspired with Lloyd’s of London, Insurance Services Office Inc. and 
others . . . to reduce sharply all liability coverage available to public agencies, businesses and 
non-profit organizations.”). 
156 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 1013. 
157 509 U.S. 764, 806 (1993). 
158 ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 68, at 167. 
159 See, e.g., Angoff, supra note 140, at 403 (“[The Texas Attorney General] alleged that 
during the insurance crisis, Aetna and other major insurance companies had agreed not to 
write certain types of ‘politically sensitive’ insurance in order to pressure state legislators to 
enact tort reform.”). 
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 In the years that followed, the intensity of that distrust may have 
waned, but the rising-tide-raises-all-ships mentality that had resulted for 
decades in steady renewals of their CGL policies by policyholders, and 
willing payment of small and moderate claims by insurers, never returned.160 
Ever since, policyholders have been more willing to consider suing their 
insurers, viewing the possibility of suit in the same risk-reward terms that 
they employ in assessing other investments. And insurers have taken 
positions adverse to their policyholders—such as seeking recoupment of 
defense costs161 and sometimes even recoupment of settlements162—that 
would have been unheard of before the events of the mid-1980s. 
 The introduction of claims-made CGL insurance was a natural 
consequence of all this. Claims-made policies cut out much of the long-tail 
coverage that occurrence policies provide. Under claims-made policies the 
policyholder is effectively a self-insurer of claims that come in waves, since 
the insurer is always free to laser-exclude coverage of a particular form of 
liability in subsequent policies. By 2018, roughly 36 percent of all CGL 
coverage was written on a claims-made basis,163 and in all probability this 
was the only form of coverage that policyholders that pose of substantial risk 
of incurring long-tail liability, like drug and chemical manufacturers, could 
obtain at tolerable cost. 
 
C. The Deceleration of a Century of Tort Liability Expansion 
 
 From the very time it came into being as a recognizable, distinct 
category of liability around 1870, the scope of tort liability for accidentally-
caused bodily injury and property damages steadily and continually 
expanded.164 Much of that expansion involved the progressive breakdown of 
 
160 See Abraham, supra note 144, at 100–01 (“[I]nstead of bringing policyholders and 
insurers back together in the joint enterprise of managing liability risk, the enactment of tort 
reform tended to drive them apart.”). 
161 See, e.g., Buss v. Superior Ct., 939 P.2d 766, 770 (Cal. 1997) (“[The insurer] reserved all 
its rights, including . . . ‘[w]ith respect to defense costs incurred or to be incurred in the 
future, . . . to be reimbursed . . . .’”); Shoshone First Bank v. Pac. Emps. Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 510, 
514 (Wyo. 2000) (“[The insurer] contends that it is entitled to allocate the defense costs 
between the claim for invasion of privacy and all the other claims involved and seek 
compensation from Shoshone for the costs of defending the other claims.”). 
162 See, e.g., Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 22 P.3d 313, 314 (Cal. 2001) (“[W]e conclude 
an insurer may be reimbursed for a reasonable settlement payment made over the objection 
of the insureds.”);  Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental 
Tools, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 42, 43 (Tex. 2008) (“In Texas, an insurer that settles a claim against 
its insured when coverage is disputed may seek reimbursement from the insured should 
coverage later be determined not to exist . . . .”). 
163 A.M. BEST COMPANY, BEST’S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES 382 (2017). 
164 The story of this expansion is told in G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (expanded ed. 2003). 




a series of no-duty and limited-duty limitations on liability for negligence.165 
Workers’ compensation, nominally a restriction of tort liability in that it 
immunized employers from liability in tort, adopted an administrative system 
of near-absolute employer liability for workplace injury.166 Though literally 
it did not involve tort liability expansion, workers’ compensation added 
credibility to arguments for moving from negligence to strict liability in tort 
itself,167 and served as a reference point in debates about strict liability in tort.  
 Then, beginning in the early 1960s, the adoption of strict liability for 
product defects in state after state took this approach, and to many observers 
seemed to signal that the move from negligence to strict liability would 
spread. If asked to predict around 1975 whether there would be more strict 
liability adopted in the coming decades, I am pretty certain that most tort 
scholars would have answered in the affirmative. Some would have 
supported such a development and others would have opposed it. 
 Make no mistake about it: there had been enormous doctrinal 
expansion, much of it chronicled in the preceding pages. Expansion 
decelerated after 1985 or so, but of course the cat was already out of the bag. 
There were few major doctrinal expansions in the scope of common law 
liability for accidentally caused physical harm, and there were even a few 
retrenchments.168 More than a century of doctrinal expansion of tort liability 
slowly came to an end in the next decades. Products liability, which was the 
most prominent field in which liability appeared to have moved from 
negligence to strict liability, moved back from that stance, and was soon 
recognized to be a predominately a form of negligence, and not strict, 
liability.169 Market-share liability, which in the early 80s seemed to be the 
latest step in the progression of liability expansion, never gained 
momentum.170 Liability for negligently-inflicted emotional distress was 
 
165 See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 937–938 (1981) (discussing the development of exceptions to the 
restricting doctrine of privity, eventually resulting in liability based on fault). 
166 See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 52–57 (tracing the evolution of liability for 
worker injury). 
167 This was recognized soon after workers compensation came into the picture. See, e.g., 
Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 235 (1914) 
(suggesting that the principle underlying workers compensation applied to tort as a whole). 
168 See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of 
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992) (tracing the end of modern tort law’s 
expansion to the period between 1981 and 1992). 
169 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (AM. L. INST. 1997).  
170 See, e.g., Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 192–93 (Ohio 1998) (rejecting 
application to DES); Spencer v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. 163 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81 (rejecting 
application to blood products); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 529 (N.J. 1989) 
(rejecting application to DPT vaccine); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 
1068 (N.Y. 2001) (rejecting application to handguns); Black v. Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d 
 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [March 2021 
 
   
 
394 
limited to a narrow set of situations.171 The century-long era of tort liability 
expansion that these developments ended coincided exactly with the advent 
of the liability insurance crisis of 1985-86.  
 Even without psychoanalyzing the judges who sat on state courts of 
last resort at that time, it seems clear beyond dispute that the liability and 
insurance crisis of the mid-1980s served as a shot across the bow of the 
judiciary. For decades, the courts had assumed that where tort liability went, 
liability insurance would follow.172 The crisis, however, seemed to show the 
judiciary that this was not necessarily true. In addition to the steep increases 
in premiums for CGL insurance purchased by corporations, other entities and 
individuals whose difficulties were more likely to influence the courts 
suffered during the crisis. For example, nurse midwives, municipalities 
whose swimming pools had diving boards, and obstetrician-gynecologists 
who delivered babies sometimes found for a time that they could not obtain 
liability insurance at any price.173  
 Judges did not have to be convinced that the courts’ expansion of tort 
liability was the exclusive cause of these features of the crisis to wonder 
whether they had at least contributed to it. This would have been a sobering 
concern for judges at all levels. There soon followed work by legal scholars 
criticizing the expansion of tort liability and opposing further expansion that 
gave judges objective reason for concern. A bit of anecdotal evidence is my 
experience, witnessing Stanley Mosk, a Justice of the Supreme Court of 
California and a leading proponent of that state’s expansions of tort liability, 
at a conference on civil liability at the Yale Law School in 1985. He sat in 
the audience as George Priest174 and Richard Epstein175 presented papers 
showing what they considered to be flaws in the modern expansions of tort 
liability. I suspect that Justice Mosk was surprised to hear his positions 
impliedly criticized by scholars from elite law schools, since the elite scholars 
of Mosk’s generation (people like William Prosser and Fleming James) had 
 
182, 189 (N.D. 1999) (declining to expand application to asbestos where the record was otherwise 
sufficient for summary judgment in favor of the defendants); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 
690 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting application to lead pigment in house paint). 
171 Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829–30 (Cal. 1989). 
172 For the classic statement of this position, see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (“The cost of an injury and the loss 
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless 
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business.”). 
173 See Abraham, supra note 142, at 402 (“Liability insurance for certain risks—directors and 
officers, nurse-midwives, day-care centers, bars and restaurants, obstetricians practicing in certain 
settings—was unavailable at any price for months at a time in some states during 1986.”). 
174 George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
175 Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985). 




been all in favor of those expansions.176 Within a few years, Mosk was joining 
majorities on his Court in declining to expand tort liability any further.177 
 There undoubtedly were other forces at work in halting the expansion 
of tort liability. Much of the tort expansion “agenda” had been achieved 
already.178 And the conservative revolution that began with the election of 
President Ronald Reagan in 1980 then spread to the states, where it resulted 
in the election or appointment of judges who, at the least, did not favor any 
further expansion of liability.179 The long-tail liabilities that had materialized 
in the decade prior to these lawyers’ ascension to the bench had to have been 
a major reason for these new judges’ stance. In any event, whatever combined 
set of factors halted the expansion of tort liability, the liability and insurance 
crisis of 1986–86 almost certainly explains why the expansion of tort liability 
halted exactly when it did. For more than three decades since then, there has 
been no important expansion in tort liability doctrine.  
 In light of this altered judicial attitude toward the expansion of tort 
liability, the courts’ continued willingness to make coverage-favoring 
decisions in insurance disputes for the next couple decades may seem to call 
out for explanation. In fact, the explanation is pretty clear and there was no 
inconstancy in this willingness. The courts in most of these subsequent 
coverage cases were interpreting and applying CGL insurance policies that 
had been sold in the past, and sometimes the distant past. There was nothing 
inconsistent about interpreting an older insurance policy in favor of coverage 
of a liability that the courts were now declining to expand, if the liability had 
in fact been imposed on a policyholder, just as the courts were continuing to 
impose tort liabilities they had already created. Courts were merely declining 
to expand liability any further. Similarly, the courts could continue to 
interpret CGL policies issued prior to 1986 in accordance with the then-
developing case law governing these policies, but also interpret the new 
occurrence policies containing absolute pollution exclusions and new claims-
made policies in accordance with their new, coverage-restricting provisions. 




176 See Priest, supra note 174, at 470–83, 512–18 (discussing Fleming James’s and William 
Prosser’s approaches to tort liability expansion). 
177 See, e.g., Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 254–56 (Cal. 1985) (limiting 
the scope of market-share liability); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) 
(holding that negligence, not strict liability, governs prescription drug cases); Anderson v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 561–63 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (concurring in an opinion rejecting hindsight analysis in failure-
to-warn cases). 
178 See Schwartz, supra note 168, at 683–84 (offering an agenda-completion explanation). 
179 See id. at 686–87 (discussing the impact of Governor Reagan’s judicial appointments on 
the apparent shift in direction of California’s tort policy). 
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D. The First Legislated Tort Law 
  
Before there was long-tail liability, tort law governing liability for 
accidental bodily injury and property damage was almost entirely common 
law.180 Tort doctrine was the province of the courts. But because of long-tail 
liability and its impact on liability insurance, tort reform statutes modifying 
the common law were enacted, and tort law became the joint province of the 
courts and legislatures. The centuries-long allocation of exclusive tort law-
making responsibility to the courts became a thing of the past. 
 
1. Medical malpractice reform 
 
 The first moves in that direction came in the mid-1970s, when there 
was a medical malpractice liability insurance “crisis” that foreshadowed the 
broader crisis that came ten years later. Medical malpractice sometimes 
involves long-tail liability, because harm caused by malpractice may occur 
during one year without manifesting itself until years later. In addition, 
statutes of limitation traditionally did not begin to run until an injured child 
reached the age of majority. Even if an injury to a child had been discovered 
around the time it occurred, it could be many years before a suit alleging 
liability for that injury was brought and resolved.181 
 Because medical malpractice coverage was occurrence-based, long-
tail claims posed the same problems for malpractice insurers that they later 
posed for CGL insurers. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, rates of suit 
increased, and with that came in increase in long-tail claims.182 Premiums for 
medical malpractice accordingly increased steeply, at just the point in the 
insurance cycle that premium rates probably would have markedly increased 
anyway (though probably to a lesser extent). Medical malpractice liability 
insurers then proposed shifting from occurrence to claims-made coverage, a 
 
180 There are only two exceptions of any significance, and these expanded liability rather 
than restricting it, as did all the tort reform statutes of the late twentieth century. The first 
exception was the adoption of the Employers Liability Act in the late nineteenth century, 
which limited the scope of employers’ defenses in negligence actions brought by their 
employees. Richard D. Epstein, The Historical Origin and Economic Structure of Workers’ 
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 778–79, 779 n.10 (1982). The second exception was 
the widespread adoption of comparative negligence by statute in the 1970s. VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ & EVELYN F. ROWE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE app. A, at 517–22 (5th ed. 2010). 
181 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. 
L. REV. 489, 502 (1977) (noting that the statute of limitations applicable to minors and people 
with disabilities may not begin to run at the time of initial injury). 
182 See Abraham, supra note 142, at 490 n.3 (noting an increase in the frequency of medical 
malpractice claims against St. Paul physicians between 1968 and 1974). 




move that alarmed physicians.183 Some insurance commissioners refused to 
approve the proposed shift, and some insurers withdrew altogether from 
selling malpractice insurance in these states. Physicians faced the prospect of 
having no malpractice insurance at all.184 
 Physicians’ concerns naturally spilled over into public controversy in 
many states. A “crisis” was declared to be in process, and both physicians’ 
representatives and medical malpractice insurers descended on state 
legislatures seeking relief. Legislatures enacted a number of significant 
insurance reforms, including authorizing the establishment of physician-
owned mutual liability insurance companies to substitute for or compete with 
commercial malpractice insurers.185 Most of these “bedpan mutuals” are still 
operating in many states. Ironically, most sell claims-made coverage.186 
 More significantly, state legislatures enacted reforms of tort liability 
that broke the historical pattern of leaving control of tort law doctrine to the 
courts. The principal and most frequently adopted reform was to adopt a cap 
or ceiling on the amount of pain and suffering damages that could be awarded 
in a medical malpractice case. California’s MICRA statute, which applied a 
$250,000 ceiling that was not indexed to inflation, is one of the most 
discussed such measures.187 But there were others, including reversing or 
limiting the collateral source rule and limiting the amount of attorneys’ 
contingent fees.188 Some of the statutory ceilings on pain and suffering 
damages eventually were held to violate state constitutional provisions, but 
most survive to this day.189 
 
183 See James R. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, 49 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 44–45 (1986) (discussing physicians’ initial apprehensions regarding 
claims-made insurance). 
184 See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 108 (1985) (discussing how the denial of proposed rate increases and disapproval of 
the claims-made form led to insurers withdrawing from the market). 
185 See id. at 109–10 (noting that there has been “spectacular growth” in physician-owned 
mutuals and reciprocals since 1975); Posner, supra note 183, at 39–40 (discussing the relative 
success of physician and medical society sponsored malpractice insurers in the 1970s and 80s). 
186 Susan Dentzer & Doug Tsuruoka, Malpractice Insurers Are Ill, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 
1985, at 58. 
187 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2021). 
188 See Prentiss E. Fagles, Betsy I. Carter, James A. Davids, Neal E. Tackabery & Clay B. 
Tousey, Jr., An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 
1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1446–50 (describing legislative reforms which have made “evidence 
of collateral payments admissible at trial or require a reduction in damages by the amount of 
such payments” and reforms which have limited the portion of recovery to which attorneys 
are entitled). 
189 See, e.g., Yates v. Pollock, 239 Cal. Rptr. 383, 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding the 
constitutionality of California’s cap on damages); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. 
Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 222–23 (Ga. 2010) (holding Georgia’s cap unconstitutional). 
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 Medical malpractice insurance is now predominantly written on a 
claims-made basis. Physicians bear much more of the risk of a long-term 
change in the liability climate than they did under occurrence policies, and 
must buy malpractice liability insurance even after they retire, because their 
prior claims-made policies will not cover claims made after the expiration of 
the policy. Notably, physicians refer to this as “buying the tail,” and typically 
do so by obtaining a single claims-made policy for a sizable sum.190 One of 
the costs of retirement, or of ceasing to practice medicine, is the cost of 
buying the tail – something that would have been completely unnecessary in 
the old world of occurrence-based coverage. 
 
2. Generally-applicable tort reform 
 
 When the crisis of the mid-1980s struck, the medical malpractice 
reforms of the prior decade were a ready template for more broadly-
applicable reforms. Though from the present standpoint the enactment of tort 
reform legislation seems unremarkable, at that point it was historically 
unprecedented. Legislatures in nearly every state enacted the first tort-reform 
statutes of general application they had ever adopted.191 Tort law became, for 
the first time, a mix of common law and legislation. 
 The most common generally-applicable reforms, as they had been a 
decade earlier in connection with medical malpractice alone, were to place 
ceilings on pain and suffering damages and to modify the collateral source 
rule.192 Another significant measure was limitation of joint and several 
liability, often to preclude full liability on the part of one co-defendant.193 
This was designed at least in part to protect municipalities, which argued that 
they were sometimes joined as defendants in serious-injury auto accident 
cases in which a driver-defendant was largely responsible for an accident but 
 
190 See, e.g., Daniel M. Bernick, How Physician Practices Should Handle Malpractice Tail, 
PHYSICIANS NEWS DIG., https://physiciansnews.com/2013/04/08/how-physician-practices-
should-handle-malpractice-tail/ [https://perma.cc/8HEU-6GXW] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) 
(describing the process of “buying the tail” and the potentially “huge” cost).   
191 For a catalogue and analysis of the reforms, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to 
the Races”: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 210 
(1990) (“Texas thereby joined the great majority of states, which enacted tort reform 
legislation between 1985 and 1988.”). For analyses of the impact of the various reforms, see 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and 
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 917 (2008) (analyzing the effects of tort reform and 
specifically those relating to medical malpractice tort reforms). 
192 Sanders & Joyce, supra note 191, at 222–24. 
193 Id.  




had purchased only the mandatory minimum amount of liability insurance, 
which was inadequate to cover the full amount of the plaintiff’s losses.194 
 Three points are noteworthy about these legislated tort reforms. First, 
for the most part, the reforms did not address whether or when a defendant is 
liable in tort. They left the standard of care and rules governing causation 
untouched. Rather, directly or indirectly, the reforms all addressed the 
amount of damages an otherwise-liable defendant was obligated to pay. 195 
The main reason for the focus on damages, I think, is that political realities 
made damages reform more feasible than liability reform. In modifying the 
law of damages, there would be no headlines that an injured person’s right to 
bring a lawsuit was being eliminated. Lawyers may understand that $250,000 
or $500,000 is not a lot of money to award a seriously injured individual for 
pain and suffering, but headlines do not capture that understanding.  
 In addition, restricting damages may have an indirect effect on the 
incidence of liability itself, by depressing the number of long-shot lawsuits 
that are brought. It may make sense for a plaintiff’s attorney to take a case 
that has no ceiling on what may be recovered, even if the odds of getting any 
recovery are small. Some long-shot cases, however, are not worth bringing at 
all if they are going to be subject to a statutory ceiling on the amount of pain 
and suffering damages that can be recovered in the case. Finally, for liability 
insurers, the incidence of liability is far more predictable than the severity of 
loss. And what matters for insurers is predictability. Various sorts of limits 
on damages rendered liability insurers’ severity of exposure more 
predictable, and that is what mattered for them. 
 A second noteworthy point is that, for the most part, the particular 
reforms that were enacted were not responsive to and did not address the 
underlying factors that made reform attractive. Long-tail liability had 
rendered the insurance markets unstable, but none of the major reforms 
addressed long-tail liability. A few minor reforms, such as the enactment of 
statutes of repose applicable to medical malpractice and products liability, 
did just that.196 These imposed absolute periods of limitation on the length of 
 
194 See 2 REPORTERS’ STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 136–38 
(AM. L. INST. 1991) (“Then the deep-pocket defendants ultimately pay a large percentage of 
any substantial judgement entered in favor of the plaintiff, regardless of relative fault among 
the injurers.”). 
195 See MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN, MICHAEL D. GREEN & MARK A. GEISTFELD, 
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 824 (10th ed. 2016) (discussing 
changes in damages and insurance rates); ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at 284 (describing 
reforms which addressed–and sometimes limited–damages that could be recovered).  
196 See, e.g., General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 3(3), 108 
Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101) (adopting an eighteen-year limitation period for 
general aviation aircraft); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4 (West 2021) (prescribing 
both a three-year statute of limitations and a seven-year statute of repose for medical 
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time after medical treatment was delivered or a product was sold available to 
bring suit. But reforms such as ceilings on pain and suffering damages, 
although they applied in both short-tail and long-tail cases, did not address 
the problems that are distinctive to long-tail cases. 
  Part of the explanation for this disconnect is that the reforms were 
enacted in the heat of the moment, before there had been time to analyze what 
was really going on. The other part of the explanation, however, is simply 
that the insurance industry and defense-oriented interest groups used the 
sense of urgency that the liability and insurance crisis created in order to 
obtain tort reforms that favored their interests, regardless of the reforms’ 
connection to the causes of the crisis. Third, and in historical terms most 
importantly, the entry of the legislatures into the tort reform arena in the late 
1980s not only changed the character of the common law of torts. From then 
on, that genie was out of the bottle. Additional legislated tort reform became 
an ever-present possibility, occupying the energies of interest groups, the 
time of legislatures, figuring in judicial elections, and even in the 2004 
election for President of the United States.197 The mixture of common law 
and legislation that the law of torts became beginning in the late 1980s could 
at any point in the future easily become even more legislated and even less 
judge-made. That is also the legacy of long-tail liability. 
 
E. The Long Reach of the Long Tail: Ripples Effects Overseas 
 
 Like any significant sector of our economy, the U.S. insurance 
markets are globally connected in many ways. As long-tail litigation 
proceeded over time, the interaction of tort law and insurance naturally had 
effects that reached beyond the border. Two of the most important such 
effects involved the changes at Lloyd’s of London generated by U.S. long-
tail liabilities, and the establishment of two Bermuda-based liability insurers 
to serve as an alternative to the standard U.S. CGL insurance market. 
 
1. The troubles at Lloyd’s 
 
 As we saw earlier, Lloyd’s began marketing occurrence-based CGL 
insurance in the U.S. in the 1950s. Even before then, Lloyd’s had sold 
accident-based CGL policies to U.S. policyholders. In my experience, a 
substantial percentage of Lloyd’s policies provided excess coverage, 
beginning with the first layer above a primary policy or a significant self-
 
malpractice torts, regardless of the age at which the harm was incurred); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–
16(a)(2) (adopting a thirty-six-month statute of limitations beginning at onset of the symptom 
caused by the faulty vaccine, regardless of the age of the patient). 
197 THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 104. 




insured retention—a layer of self-insurance that functioned much like a 
deductible. By the 1980s, in many significant claims for coverage of long-tail 
bodily injury or environmental cleanup coverage, Lloyd’s was likely to have 
provided at least as much coverage to the policyholder as any other insurer. 
 Lloyd’s operated under a unique, and it turned out, antiquated, 
financial structure. Lloyd’s itself was, and is, simply an insurance exchange. 
“Syndicates” within Lloyd’s actually issued policies, and the syndicates were 
not corporations with limited liability. Rather, the bearers of risk under 
policies issued by Lloyd’s “syndicates” were individuals, or “Names,” whose 
entire wealth (by virtue of their arrangement with a syndicate) stood behind 
any syndicate in which they invested and were therefore potentially at risk.198 
Three years after a policy was issued, any remaining liability covered by a 
policy was reinsured within Lloyd’s itself by other syndicates that also had 
the entire wealth of individual Names standing behind them. This was 
referred to as “reinsurance-to-close,” that is, reinsurance effective until the 
policies were ultimately closed.199 
  In theory, individual Names could be called upon to supply additional 
capital to syndicates in which they had invested, up to the point at which the 
Names themselves had no remaining assets.200 But until the 1980s, this rarely 
occurred because the syndicates were profitable. With the coming of long-
tail insurance coverage litigation, however, Lloyd’s syndicates saw massive 
amounts of capital being paid, and at risk of being paid, to U.S. 
policyholders.201 Over the twenty-five year period ending in 1987, Lloyd’s 
profits were approximately £4 billion. Over the next five years, losses were 
£8 billion.202 The personal assets of thousands of Lloyd’s Names—many of 
them prominent people in the United Kingdom—were in jeopardy. 
 Lloyd’s then saved itself from ruin. It established and funded a 
separate entity, named “Equitas,” to be the repository of its syndicates’ 
liability under CGL policies issued prior to 1992.203 Establishing such an 
entity, of course, could not unilaterally limit or foreclose a policyholder’s rights 
against a syndicate that had sold them coverage. But in 2006, Warren Buffett’s 
 
198 Theodore A. Boundas et al., Lloyd’s and the London Market: Overview and Recent 
Developments, in UNDERSTANDING LLOYD’S AND THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET: HOW 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT YOUR CLIENTS 9 (Practicing Law Institute, 1996). 
199 Id. at 10; Richard E. Stewart & Steven E. Sigalow, How Lloyd’s Saved Itself, 37 INS. F. 
9, 12–13 (2010).  
200 Boundas et al., supra note 198 at 10. 
201 The story, up to 1993, is told in ADAM RAPHAEL, ULTIMATE RISK: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE LLOYD’S CATASTROPHE 99–203 (1994). 
202 Robert M. Hall, Lloyd’s of London: Reconstruction and Renewal, Credit for Reinsurance 
and Equitas, in UNDERSTANDING LLOYD’S AND THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET: HOW 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT YOUR CLIENTS 202 (Practicing Law Institute, 1996).  
203 See Boundas et al., supra note 198, at 18–19; Stewart & Sigalow, supra note 199, at 12–13. 
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company, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., reinsured all of Equitas’s liabilities, and the 
Names were effectively insulated from any personal liability.204   
 At the same time, Lloyd’s modified its centuries-old financial 
structure. Going forward, syndicates were to be corporate entities with 
limited liability, and there would be no Names. Individuals could buy stock 
in syndicates, but their liability would be limited in same manner as any 
shareholder’s liability. 
 One of the ways that Equitas remained solvent was by engaging in a 
prolonged and hard-nosed program of commuting its liabilities. After this 
program took effect, policyholders negotiating with Lloyd’s over their long-
tail coverage claims encountered two obstacles. First, in order to preserve its 
funds over the long period over which it would be exposed to liability, 
Equitas “reserved” a certain amount of money for any given claim or set of 
claims by a particular policyholder, and was usually able to credibly assert 
that this (undisclosed) reserve was the maximum sum that Equitas could pay 
to settle a claim. Policyholders understood that, because Equitas had no 
capital coming in from the sale of new policies, and because of the internal 
bureaucratic difficulty of reversing a reserving decision, for practical 
purposes the undisclosed reserve, whatever it was, served as a ceiling on the 
amount that Equitas could pay to settle a claim. Negotiations took place in 
the shadow of this constraint, in my experience, to some extent to the 
disadvantage of policyholders. 
 Second, Equitas’s strongly held negotiating position was that it would 
not enter into settlements that preserved any coverage in place. Equitas was 
determined to close out its liabilities, and not to pay a policyholder a large 
sum now but still to be on the hook in the future for other, as-yet unmade 
long-tail coverage claims under existing Lloyd’s policies. Consequently, 
settlements had to involve full releases of all of the policyholder’s rights 
under its Lloyd’s policies. These were referred to as full “buybacks” or 
“global settlements” of coverage.205 
 Many, perhaps most, policyholders whose long-tail coverage claims 
had not yet been resolved by 1996 settled with Equitas on this basis.206 But 
the full buybacks that Equitas effectively required, and which were often then 
demanded not only by Equitas but also by other settling insurers, created an 
important new issue down the line. When a policyholder had settled with an 
insurer using a full buyback, the significance of that settlement for the 
policyholders’ other, non-settling insurers created a complex question: If the 
policyholder later tried a coverage case against a non-settling insurer over a 
 
204 Stewart & Sigalow, supra note 199, at 15. 
205 Id.  
206 See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co., 864 F.3d 130, 150–151 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(assessing the impact of plaintiff’s settlements with prior insurers). 




discrete liability or set of liabilities, as was often the case, to what extent was 
that insurer entitled to an offset on account of the fact that the full buyback 
settlement with Lloyd’s had paid the policyholder something, but not 
everything, for that discrete liability?207 The policyholder’s current judgment 
against the insurer in question was for apples (a discrete liability or set of 
liabilities), whereas the settlement with Lloyd’s was for fruit salad that 
included, but was not limited to, apples. More than thirty years after the 
advent of long-tail insurance coverage litigation, that and related issues are 
still being addressed, often through the making of new law.208 
 
2. Bermuda insurance 
  
In the midst of the crisis of 1985 and 1986, major policyholders had 
concerns about obtaining sufficient excess liability insurance, because of the 
reduced capacity of the U.S. and Lloyd’s markets. Large entities can 
effectively self-insure against a steady stream of comparatively small 
liabilities. A predictable number of judgments or settlements in excess of a 
million dollars, with a larger number in smaller amounts, can easily be 
handled without the need for liability insurance, and certainly without excess 
liability insurance. What the companies needed from liability insurance was 
protection against major or catastrophic liability, whether from a single 
incident or from an unexpectedly severe series of individual incidents.209 
 After some development, the largest U.S. insurance broker, Marsh & 
McLennan, with the assistance of the J.P. Morgan Guaranty Bank, devised a 
plan to establish in Bermuda a high-level excess insurance company to 
provide Marsh’s corporate clients a stable source of such coverage. The new 
insurance company established in late 1985 to provide such coverage was 
ACE Insurance Company Ltd.210 Six months later a second company that 
would provide lower-level excess coverage, XL Insurance Ltd., was also 
established in Bermuda.211 The founders of this approach wanted to ensure that 
the coverage offered by ACE and XL both would be stable, and not subject to 
what they knew insurers considered to be the extreme pro-policyholder stance 
that many U.S. courts were taking in long-tail coverage cases.  
 
207 See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Allocation of Settlements in Multi-Insurer Coverage 
Disputes, 48 FED’N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 427 (1998) (discussing problems arising when a 
policyholder brings claims against many liability insurers but does not settle with all of them). 
208 See, e.g., Olin Corp., 864 F.3d at 154 (remanding case to ascertain the effect of Olin’s 
previous settlement with London Market Insurers, but providing “guiding principles” on the 
issue, including on Condition C and the prior insurance provision).  
209 See THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 233–35 (analyzing rationales for the ways 
that large corporations purchase liability insurance).  
210 CATHERINE R. DUFFY, HELD CAPTIVE: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE IN 
BERMUDA 183–87 (2004). 
211 Id. at 208. 
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 The whole point was to develop a policy that was not exposed to these 
vulnerabilities, but that would nonetheless be attractive to major U.S. 
policyholders seeking excess liability insurance. To achieve this purpose, the 
Bermuda insurers included four new features of their policies that 
distinguished them from the conventional U.S. CGL insurance policies that 
were vulnerable to long-tail liability in the ways that had been revealed in the 
preceding years.  
 
a. An occurrence-reported trigger and a batch clause  
 
The trigger of coverage under Bermuda policies is an occurrence that 
is reported during the policy period and took place after any earlier retroactive 
date specified in the policy.212 These policies contain a standard exclusion for 
expected or intended harm, but contain an exception to the exclusion for harm 
that is “different in kind or greater in order of magnitude” than was expected 
and intended. And the policies permit the policyholder to give notice of an 
occurrence that may give rise in the future to a batch of claims or suits.213 
 This hybrid of occurrence and claims-made policies was designed to 
suit the needs of the corporate policyholders for whom Bermuda policies 
originally were offered. Auto makers and drug companies often encounter a 
series of separate claims arising out of the same alleged designed defect in an 
auto model, or the same failure to warn of a side effect associated with a 
particular drug.214 If injuries associated with these situations start to be 
reported to such companies, then they often expect such injuries to continue 
to occur in the future, and thus during subsequent policy periods. Yet under 
conventional CGL occurrence policies, these future injuries could be 
considered expected and therefore excluded. And under conventional claims-
made policies, the insurer could simply include a targeted exclusion in future 
policies and therefore avoid covering them. 
 The combined effect of the Bermuda provisions, in contrast, is that 
once a policyholder experiences, or expects to experience, a spike in claims 
or suits arising out of the same general cause, it can declare a batch-
occurrence, and secure coverage of liability for claims or suits falling into 
 
212 RICHARD JACOBS, LORELIE S. MASTERS & PAUL STANLEY, LIABILITY INSURANCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE BERMUDA FORM 19–21 (2d ed. 2011); DAVID SCOREY, 
RICHARD GEDDES & CHRIS HARRIS, THE BERMUDA FORM: INTERPRETATION AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION OF EXCESS LIABILITY INSURANCE 166–92 (2d ed. 2018). 
213 JACOBS ET AL., supra note 212, at 122. 
214 See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 386, 392 (D. Mass. 1979) (certifying a 
plaintiff class in a putative action involving, among other things, the failure to warn about 
dangers posed by the drug DES); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Balancing the Scales: The Ford-
Firestone Case, the Internet, and the Future Dispute Resolution Landscape, 6 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 4–7 (2003–2004) (describing suits against Ford Motor Co. for rollover accidents 
involving SUVs). 




that category even if they involve bodily injury or property damage that has 
not yet occurred, and even if claims or suits alleging such liability have not 
yet been made or brought.215 For insurers, the occurrence-reported feature of 
Bermuda policies has one of the advantages of claims-made coverage: it 
prevents the stacking, or the cumulation of coverage under multiple policies. 
Only one year of coverage is ever available for liability arising out of a given 
batch occurrence. The advantage for policyholders, on the other hand, is that 
they can choose which single policy year on which to rely for coverage and be 
assured that future claims falling into a batch declared that year will be covered. 
 
b. An arbitration requirement 
 
The policies require that disputes be arbitrated in London under the 
rules of the English Arbitration Act of 1996.216 Bermuda policy arbitrations 
are confidential. As a consequence, decisions by one tribunal have no 
precedential effect in any other matter.217 And the arbitrations are designed 
to be streamlined proceedings. Direct testimony usually is presented in 
written form. Hearings involve cross-examination plus extended closing 
statements by counsel—sometimes (in my experience) lasting a full day or 
more.218 Finally, for the Bermuda insurers, arbitration has the great advantage 
of not being subject to decision by U.S. judges and juries, and the perceived 
vicissitudes of the U.S. litigation environment. 
 
c. New York law applies  
 
Bermuda policies provide that disputes under the policy are governed 
by New York law.219 The great advantage of this choice of law was that 
arbitrators could look to the law of a single state for guidance and would not 
have to contend with conflicting choice of law arguments made by the parties. 
At the time the first Bermuda policies were drafted, New York, while not 
ultraconservative or decidedly insurer-oriented, had not been the source of 
any of the insurance policy interpretations that insurers regarded as being 
highly result-oriented and policyholder-favoring. New York had been more 
nearly neutral on that scale, and pro-insurer in regard to the meaning of the 
 
215 Some versions of the Bermuda policy refer to this as an “integrated” occurrence. DAVID 
SCOREY ET AL., supra note 213, at 110–18. 
216 Id. at 24. 
217 See RICHARD JACOBS ET AL., supra note 213, at 290 (describing confidentiality 
requirements in Bermuda Form arbitration). The linkage of arbitration with confidentiality 
means that there is no precedent-setting through arbitral decisions. Kenneth S. Abraham & 
J.W. Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 360 (2003). 
218 RICHARD JACOBS ET AL., supra note 213, at 293.  
219 Id. at 26. 
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qualified pollution exclusion.220 So the Bermuda insurers predicted 
(accurately, as it turned out) that as law governing other issues developed, the 
New York courts would maintain that pattern. 
 
d. No contra proferentem or extrinsic evidence  
 
In another reaction to the pro-coverage judicial decisions of the early 
1980s, Bermuda policies provide that they are to be construed “in an 
evenhanded fashion,” and even where policy language is ambiguous, without 
any “presumption or arbitrary interpretation in favor of either the Insured or 
the Insurer,” “without regard to authorship of the language,” and “without 
reference to parol or other reference extrinsic evidence.” Rather, construction 
is to occur “in the manner most consistent with the relevant provisions” of 
the policy.221 This left Bermuda policyholders without a major advantage that 
they had under U.S. CGL policies—the ability to make use of the doctrine 
that ambiguous policy language is construed against the drafter, and therefore 
in favor of coverage, by virtue of the contra proferentem (“against the 
drafter”) principle.  
 This set-up had obvious advantages for the Bermuda insurers, but it 
also rendered arbitrations more challenging in one way. One of the great 
advantages of contra proferentem is that it is a tie-breaker when extrinsic 
evidence does not dictate the meaning of an ambiguous policy provision and 
there is therefore no single correct interpretation of the language.222 With this 
tie-breaker removed, arbitrators sometimes are left to struggle without much 
internal guidance from the complex policy language regarding how to resolve 
the particular dispute at hand.223 
 Bermuda policies have come to be important tools for major 
corporations seeking insurance coverage of liabilities of major magnitude. 
Other offshore insurers now sometimes sell coverage on the Bermuda form, 
and the two original Bermuda insurers have gone on to have great success. 
ACE branched into the U.S. market for conventional insurance, first by 
purchasing CIGNA, and then recently by acquiring Chubb, a major player in 
 
220 Id. at 27. 
221 Id. at 44.  
222 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: LIAB. INS. § 4 (AM. L. INST. 2019) (describing how courts 
interpret ambiguous policy terms). 
223 Partly in reaction to this challenge, I think, a practice has grown up in which, although 
evidence of the intentions of the parties to the policy is understood to be foreclosed by the 
above-quoted construction clause, evidence of what English lawyers call the “factual matrix” 
is sometimes admitted. DAVID SCOREY ET AL., supra note 213, at 76. The factual matrix may 
include evidence of the business purpose of policy provisions, prior now-modified provisions 
from earlier versions of the Bermuda policy, and sometimes even circulars issued generally 
to the Bermuda policy market describing the purpose of redrafted policy provisions. The 
result is something of a hybrid approach to the interpretation of ambiguous policy provisions.  




both commercial and personal lines insurance in the U.S.224 XL is about to 
be acquired by AXA, a European insurer, and when that is accomplished, 
AXA will become the one of the world’s largest insurance companies.225 
 All this came about because of the development of a liability 
insurance policy whose terms would appear utterly bizarre to anyone not 
familiar with the reasons the policy came into being: the policies are issued 
in Bermuda to U.S. policyholders, but require the specific application of New 
York law; disputes about New York law nevertheless must be resolved in 
arbitration, not in New York or even in the United States, but in London; and 
the policies set aside the first rule of insurance law: that ambiguous insurance 
policy language is to be interpreted in favor of coverage. The Bermuda 
policies are a graphic example of the tortuous path that long-tail liability has 
caused liability insurance to travel. 
 
F. Increased Corporate Self-Insurance 
  
There has been a decided increase in the percentage of civil liability 
costs that are self-insured by commercial entities since the 1970s.226 
Although data on the practice is scant, one study found that the percentage of 
commercial lines tort costs that are self-insured went from 6% in 1973, to 
25.5% in 1985, to 44.4% in 2010.227 Most of this self-insurance is likely to 
be at low levels of liability and to function as a self-insured retention, or SIR, 
which is the economic equivalent of a deductible.  
 This trend toward self-insurance signifies that corporate entities have 
chosen to bear an increasing percentage of small liability risk themselves 
rather than insuring against this risk. For sizable corporations, CGL insurance 
has become increasingly important as a tool used mainly to protect against 
large, potentially catastrophic liabilities. Long-tail liability has to be 
considered at least partly responsible for this increase in self-insuring because 
long-tail liability so influenced modification of liability insurance policies to 
 
224 ACE Ltd., ACE Completes Acquisition of Chubb; Adopts Chubb Name and Launches 
New Chubb Brand, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (January 14, 2016, 6:03 ET), https://www. 
prnewswire.com/news-releases/ace-completes-acquisition-of-chubb-adopts-chubb-name-and-
launches-new-chubb-brand-300204936.html [https://perma.cc/M64U-8S9P]. 
225 Matthew Dalton & Ben Dummett, AXA to Buy Insurer XL Group for $15.3 Billion, WALL 
ST. J. (March 5, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/axa-to-buy-xl-group-for-15-
3-billion-1520236823 [https://perma.cc/4H3C-79AX]. 
226 Priest, supra note 142, at 1550. 
227 Robert P. Hartwig, President & Economist, CPCU, Presentation Entitled Adapting to an 
Ever-Changing and Risky World of Tort Liability at the American Bar Association Magna 
Carta 800 Conference 13 (June 12, 2015) (presentation can be downloaded from https:// 
www.iii.org/presentation/adapting-to-an-ever-changing-and-risky-world-of-tort-liability-06 
1015 [https://perma.cc/FAC8-QR9R]). 
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the point at which they have become a less and less attractive means of 
insuring against routine liability. 
 Self-insuring against routine liabilities had always made more 
economic sense than corporate policyholders seemed to have recognized. 
This is because the larger the entity, the more predictable its stream of 
comparatively small liabilities, and the more sense it makes for the entity to 
serve, in effect, as its own insurer of these highly predictable liabilities. 
Nonetheless, less such self-insuring than might have been expected seems to 
have occurred. Once litigation over long-tail coverage claims became 
commonplace, however, policyholders may have realized that they might 
well face more litigation over coverage of even routine liabilities than they 
had in the past. The perceived balance between the costs and benefits of self-
insuring may then have shifted, given that recovering coverage of low-level 
liabilities could no longer be seen as essentially costless. 
 In fact, it is not at all clear why the largest corporations purchase any 
liability insurance at all, given that (in my experience) they purchase and have 
always purchased less than $1 billion per year of CGL insurance coverage. 
Just to take an example, General Electric Company had approximately $120 
billion in revenue in 2017.228 An extraordinary liability of as much as $500 
million would constitute less than one-half of one percent of that revenue. 
Why insure any of this potential liability? It may be that the cost of 
purchasing insurance against such a liability, and the cost of litigating with 
dozens of insurers over coverage of it, is worth the smoothing of GE’s 
balance sheet that having insurance against such a liability provides.229 
Otherwise GE could have to post on its balance sheet a $500 million liability 
that would affect its earnings in a particular quarter of its fiscal year. The 
securities markets might overreact; the availability of insurance cushions 
against that reaction. In addition, as Tom Baker and Sean Griffith have 
suggested, corporate managers probably have concentrated investments in 
the company for which they work, and therefore stand to benefit more from 
the risk-spreading accomplished by insurance than the company’s 
shareholders, whose investment are likely to be more diversified.230 Perhaps 
that also explains the purchase of liability insurance by major U.S. 
corporations, since the managers influence what insurance is purchased. 
 
228 General Electric Co. Annual Income Statement, MARKETWATCH, https://www.market 
watch.com/ investing/stock/ge/financials [https://perma.cc/68YT-6HAK]. 
229 See, e.g., THE LIABILITY CENTURY, supra note 1, at 233–34 (describing large 
corporations’ expertise in managing risk and shareholders’ perceptions of it). 
230 TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY 
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 57–76 (2010); see also Victor P. 
Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & 
ECON., 541, 543 (2009) (arguing that insurers supply valuable risk management services). 




 Confirmation of the notion that the purchase of liability insurance by 
these entities is not necessarily economically rational came in 2010, after the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. BP, which 
leased the rig and bore the lion’s share of financial responsibility for the 
damage caused by the spill, apparently had made a considered decision not 
to carry any insurance against liability arising out of its drilling activities.231 
Yet, after paying upwards of $20 billion for that damage, BP continued as a 
going, and arguably financially healthy, concern.232 It seems highly likely 
that part of BPs decision can be ascribed to the economic considerations I 
have just described. BP is just an extreme example of the increased amount 
of self-insuring in which large corporate entities began to engage after long-
tail liability came to have such a far-reaching influence on the nature and 




During the last fifty years, long-tail liability has produced far-
reaching and, in many respects, fundamental changes in tort and insurance 
law. The consequences of those legal changes were felt in many ways, as law 
practice, the insurance markets, and insurance institutions adjusted to deal 
with the changes. To a large extent, long-tail liabilities were the legacy of 
industrial activity that occurred during the first half of the twentieth century, 
and of the major chemical and pharmaceutical advances of the middle of that 
century. Both developments caused latent bodily injury, property damage, 
and environmental pollution that eventually led to new forms of liability, new 
insurance law, and new forms of liability insurance. It took half a century for 
this to occur because it took place through common law litigation in which 
each state has its own law. 
 But has long-tail liability seen its heyday? It is the very nature of long-
tail liability not to herald its arrival. Rather, when long-latent harm appears, 
it tells us that we have until now failed to recognize that harms that were 
caused in the distant past and are only now manifesting themselves. The 
harms may be physical, but they may also be emotional or economic. 
 
231 See STEPHEN LOWE, JOSEPH LEBENS & MICHAEL PUMMELL, TOWERS WATSON, 
DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER: INSURANCE INDUSTRY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2010), 
http://docplayer.net/12320459-Deepwater-horizon-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/44D2-RZ7R] 
(“[A]lthough named as a defendant in more than 300 lawsuits stemming from the incident, 
BP itself has no commercial liability insurance coverage for the event.”). 
232 See Steve Olenski, Nearly Four Years After Deepwater Horizon, Has BP’s Brand Image 
Recovered?, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:54 PM),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/ 
2014/01/24/nearly-four-years-after-deepwater-horizon-has-bps-brand-image-recovered/#11 
4429dc61f6 [https://perma.cc/H83U-QQ9L] (“[T]he company remains an economic 
behemoth and a major player in a commodity the world hopelessly depends on.”). 
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Whether harms are now occurring out of sight that will only be recognized 
decades from now is impossible to say. And, if long-tail harms do eventually 
materialize, it is impossible to say for certain whether the new legal doctrines 
that were created to deal with twentieth-century long-tail harms will be 
adequate for dealing with the kinds of harms that occur as a result of twenty-
first century activities. 
 For example, gene therapy and the use of biologics are rapidly 
becoming a substitute for the use of chemotherapy to treat various forms of 
cancer. Although pre-clinical testing is designed to detect the adverse side 
effects of such new therapies, it is in the nature of long-tail harm that short-
term testing often cannot detect the risk that it will occur. We cannot very 
well spend twenty or thirty years waiting around to see whether a new therapy 
or drug that promises to save life may lead in the long run to the occurrence 
of harm in a small fraction of those who would benefit from the new therapy 
or drug. Short-term animal studies sometimes are directed at predicting long-
term human effects, but they cannot be completely successful in doing so. As 
the use of new gene and other molecular-level therapies accelerates, whether 
long-tail harm will accompany them remains an open question. I am not at 
all sure that current tort law is adequate to the task of dealing with potential 
liability for such harm, when and if it occurs. To give just one example, 
doctrines that could be applied to potential liability in situations in which a 
therapy saves a life but causes long-term, unexpected harm are 
underdeveloped. What the long-tail liability revolution has definitely taught 
us, however, is that creating new common law to deal with a fundamentally 
new problem is unlikely to take place quickly. 
 Similarly, it is unclear whether there will be an epidemic of long-tail 
cyber-harm – economic, dignitary, emotional, or physical -- that materializes 
in the future. There are weekly news reports that major companies have 
recently discovered that their digital records were hacked at some point in the 
past, with potential credit, privacy, and identity-theft harms resulting. We do 
not know how much harm hacking that has already occurred, or will occur in 
the future, has already caused or will cause in the future. Hacking not only 
harms those whose privacy is compromised but may also cause other effects 
such as enabling interference with elections, utility grids, self-driving cars, 
and any number of further functions that become automated in ways that are 
both beneficial and risky. And cyber-insurance, a growing phenomenon in 
the insurance market, will be called upon for coverage.  
 Yet current doctrines governing long-term cyber-related harm, and 
insurance against liability for such harm, also are underdeveloped. The courts 
will have to work out the contours of liability for the new forms of liability 
and of insurance coverage for that liability. The decentralized system that 
produces the common law of civil liability and insurance is likely to be at 
least one source of the law governing these new issues. Certainly, the current 




national political climate gives us no reason to think that the legislation, or 
regulation so characteristic of the administrative state will be able to take over 
handling these new liability and compensation problems. Yet, as we have 
seen, although the common law system may be capable of coping with these 
issues, it is likely to take a long time to do so.  
 In short, the rise of long-tail liability was the most significant 
influence on the changes that have taken place in tort and insurance law in 
the last fifty years. This form of liability is of singular importance for that 
reason alone. But it may be important as time goes on as well. Only the future 
will tell us whether this form of liability will exert the same kind of influence 
on legal development when new forms of long-tail harm arise and pose 
challenges for the doctrinal current structure of tort and insurance law.  
 
